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Andrew Carter*

ALCHEMICAL RULEMAKING AND
IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING: LESSONS FROM THE
40-YEAR BATTLE TO REGULATE MERCURY
EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS
ABSTRACT
Environmental mercury has long been linked to adverse health
impacts on human populations. Globally ubiquitous at ambient
levels in air and water, it can reach potentially unsafe levels in
fish as it biologically magnifies and accumulates through aquatic
and marine food webs. Vulnerable communities, including many
communities of color, are particularly at risk from fish-borne
mercury. Despite the fact that coal-fired electric generating units
have been recognized as major sources of environmental
mercury since the 1970s, and that the Environmental Protection
Agency discussed possible future regulations of mercury
emissions from such plants in 1975, it was not until 2014 that the
Obama administration promulgated the Mercury and Air Toxics
Rule regulating such emissions – and not until 2016 that the rule
appeared to be firmly in place after the Environmental
Protection Agency’s revised findings promulgated in response to
the Supreme Court’s remand in Michigan v. EPA.
This article examines the more than forty-year-long debate over
mercury emissions regulations from electric generating utilities,
situating it in the context of both scientific uncertainty and the
larger legal and ideological conflicts that have grown to define
environmental policy discourse in the United States since the
1970s. It focuses on the discursive tactics – the ways actors
interpret the meaning of both laws and science, and frame those
meanings in ways that push regulatory actions in directions that
those actors want them to go, even when they seem to conflict
with the plain language of the Clean Air Act. While offering a
historically comprehensive account, it pays special attention to
contrasting the development of the Bush-era Clean Air Mercury
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Rule in 2005 with the far different Obama-era Mercury and Air
Toxics Rule. The development of these two rules show how the
same statutory language can lead to significantly different
regulatory regimes depending on the ideological motivations of
those in power, and environmental justice can frequently be
abrogated in favor of commercial interests. Considering the
Trump administration’s call for significant rollbacks in
environmental protection laws, this article may provide insight
into what happens to environmental statutory interpretation and
varying strategic interpretations of scientific uncertainty. Just as
ancient alchemists saw mercury as an element of change and
flux, ideological actors in the modern federal rulemaking process
have seen the rules governing mercury emission as subject to its
own transmutation, able to flow and transform into different
manifestations as ideological actors gain control of the
regulatory crucible.
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to industry
petitioners seeking to invalidate the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s)
rule regulating the emissions of mercury and other Hazardous Air Pollutants
(HAPs) from coal- and oil-fired electric generating units (EGUs)1 under Section
112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).2 That ruling appears—at least currently3—to
signal the end of a forty-year debate over EPA regulation of EGU-sourced
mercury, a conflict that intensified after a 2000 rule promulgated by the Clinton
administration regulating EGU-sourced HAPs, and escalated over the next sixteen
years as successive administrations attempted to implement mercury regulations
that reflected dramatically different environmental ideologies.4 The latest ruling
1. Michigan v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 2463 (2016) (mem). Industry petitioners sought to overturn the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in White Stallion Energy Center, L.L.C. v. EPA, where the court remanded the
rule to EPA rather than vacate it. White Stallion Energy Ctr., L.L.C. v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 2015 WL
11051103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2015) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 136 S.
Ct. 2463 (2016) (mem).
2. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
3. The recent election of Donald Trump, who has taken office with Republican majorities in both
the House and Senate, and who has called for significant rollbacks in environmental protection laws,
renders the issue slightly more uncertain than it appeared prior to November 8, 2016. As will be
described in further detail in this article, the current regulations are currently codified, and any changes
would have to be implemented through either a new rulemaking process or changes to the Clean Air Act
itself. Should the mercury emissions limitations discussed become a target of new rulemaking, this
article becomes not just a work of environmental legal history but a possible blueprint to how those
attacks may be carried out.
4. As will be discussed in more detail below, the rulemaking history concerning EGU-sourced
mercury and other HAPs is convoluted: EPA initially promulgated a rule regulating such emissions from
EGUs in 2000 during the Clinton administration, attempted to reverse that decision in 2005 during the
Bush administration, re-”confirmed” the 2000 rule in 2012 during the Obama administration after the
D.C. Circuit Court invalidated the attempted 2005 revision, but then had to revise the original 2000
listing decision after the Supreme Court held it had impermissibly fail to account for costs. Regulatory
Finding on the Emissions of HAPs from EGUs, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter 2000
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comes almost a year after the Supreme Court invalidated the same rule on the
grounds that it impermissibly failed to incorporate costs into the decision to
regulate EGUs under Section 112, leading the D.C. Circuit Court to remand the
Obama administration’s attempt to put into effect stringent HAP emissions
restrictions opposed by the EGU industry, in Michigan v. EPA.5
Until recently, the decades-long debate over whether EGU-sourced
mercury should be regulated under the HAP provisions of the CAA has been
consistently resolved in favor of the EGU industry and a “wait and see” approach
that used scientific uncertainty as a rationale to avoid regulations the energy
industry sees as financially undesirable, even as evidence has increasingly shown
that environmental mercury may pose a risk to a significant number of Americans,
particularly children and the unborn.6
Mercury is a toxic contaminant that has long been linked to adverse health
impacts on humans and other organisms. Though found naturally, anthropogenic
sources of mercury, particularly industrial emissions, have significantly increased
environmental levels over the past two hundred years.7 While mercury is globally
ubiquitous at ambient levels in air and water, it can reach potentially unsafe levels
in fish as it magnifies and accumulates through aquatic and marine food webs,
threatening the health of human populations that consume seafood in significant
quantities.8 Over the past several decades, increased understanding of the mercury
cycle and the potential health impacts of environmental mercury has led to legal
and regulatory mechanisms both domestically and abroad intended to mitigate such
health risks.9 However, such regulations are complicated not only by significant
Listing Rule]; Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of HAPs From EGUs
and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs From the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar.
29, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Delisting Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 40, 63) (“We are taking this
action because we now believe that the December 2000 finding lacked foundation and because recent
information demonstrates that it is not appropriate or necessary to regulate [EGUs] under section 112.”);
Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs and Standards of Performance for
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9335 (Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter
2012 Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, or 2012 MATS Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63)
(“New technical analyses conducted by EPA confirm that it remains appropriate and necessary to
regulate HAP emissions from EGUs.”); Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to
Regulate HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter 2016
Supplemental Finding] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712
(2015) (invalidating and reversing the 2012 MATS Rule); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577–78
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the 2005 Delisting Rule). Principal proposed and final rules are discussed
herein; as with many complex rulemaking processes, numerous minor technical corrections are
published through the Federal Register, but are not referenced unless substantively relevant to the
discussion at hand.
5. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712.
6. Research regarding adverse health effects of mercury is discussed in Section I.A below.
7. See generally E.G. Pacyna et al., Global Emission of Mercury to the Atmosphere from
Anthropogenic Sources in 2005 and Projections to 2020, 44 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 2487 (2010).
8. For an explanation of bioaccumulation and biomagnification processes, see Richard L.
Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to Regulate Toxic Substances that can
Bioaccumulate, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 605, 609–18 (1993).
9. A number of state and federal statutes and regulations regulate mercury from a variety of
sources in products, food, and the environment, though a comprehensive discussion of such regulations
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uncertainty in how mercury moves through the environment and to what extent it
affects humans and other organisms once it has entered the body, but also by
political and economic interests that impact the success and stringency of
regulations.10
One of the most significant anthropogenic sources of environmental
mercury is the EGU sector.11 Despite growing scientific and public concerns in the
1960s and 1970s over anthropogenic mercury in the United States, and the
enactment of the CAA, which allowed federal regulation of airborne toxics,12 EPA
has historically been largely unwilling to directly regulate EGU-sourced mercury.
While EPA began regulating atmospheric mercury emissions under Section 112
from certain other sources as early as 1973, it did not attempt to regulate EGUsourced mercury as a HAP until 2000, a decision which the second Bush
is beyond the scope of this article. The focus here is on EGU-sourced mercury emissions regulations
under CAA because those emissions currently make up the largest single source of anthropogenic
mercury emissions in the United States, and because the complex regulatory history concerning them
offers a compelling case study in the evolution of, and difficulties inherent in, the U.S. system of federal
environmental governance. Furthermore, the federal environmental regulatory scheme is enormously
complex, and other environmental laws and regulations can, in theory, regulate EGU-sourced mercury
indirectly; for example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires states to report waterbodies containing
certain levels of pollutants, including both mercury generally and methylmercury specifically, that may
have been deposited from EGU emissions. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012) (Water
quality standards and implementation plan provision of CWA); EPA Water Quality Standards, 40
C.F.R. pt. 131 (2016). For a general overview of mercury regulation in the United States, see U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
Environmental
Laws
that
Apply
to
Mercury,
https://www.epa.gov/mercury/environmental-laws-apply-mercury (last visited Sept. 9, 2017); and see
Wendy Thomas, Note, Through the Looking Glass: A Reflection on Current Mercury Regulation, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145 (2004) (discussing Federal mercury regulations generally). Also beyond the
scope of this article is an in-depth treatment of the Minamata Convention, a global treaty created in 2013
to regulate mercury releases to the environment and to which the United States is a party. Minamata
Convention,
Oct.
10,
2013,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/10/20131010%201116%20AM/CTC-XXVII-17.pdf. While Article 8 of the Minamata Convention requires the U.S. to take
steps to reduce EGU-sourced mercury emissions, it currently stands as a sole executive agreement
entered into under the President’s executive authority, meaning that as of now compliance with the
Convention will be carried out through the CAA rulemaking discussed here. Such efforts could be
abandoned by the new administration. For a discussion of legal issues relating to the domestic
implementation of sole executive agreements, see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007).
10. For earlier accounts of EGU-sourced mercury regulation, see Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I.
Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration (pt. 1), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10297
(2004) [hereinafter Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I]; Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect
Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration (pt. 2), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485 (2004) [hereinafter
Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II]; David Rugh, Note, Clearer, But Still Toxic Skies: A Comparison of the
Clear Skies Act, Congressional Bills, and the Proposed Rule to Control Mercury Emissions from CoalFired Power Plants, 28 VT. L. REV. 201 (2004); James Ruhl, Note, Quicksilver Alchemy: New
England’s Mercury Control Programs and the Clean Air Mercury Rule, 32 VT. L. REV. 525 (2008); and
Thomas, supra note 9.
11. The majority of EGU mercury emissions come from coal-fired electric utility generators,
though oil-fired generators also emit mercury in smaller amounts. Gas-powered EGUs do not emit
mercury in any significant amount; for the purposes of this article, and consistent with EPA’s own
definition, “EGUs” without any qualifier as to type refers to coal- and oil-fired utility units generating
electricity for sale, typically found in electric utility installations.
12. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 77 Stat. 392 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
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administration would attempt to retract, leading to lengthy court battles, a
subsequent attempted re-implementation by the Obama administration in 2011, the
Michigan decision and its aftermath.
The historic failure to regulate EGU-sourced mercury has not been driven
by any single factor. Legitimate scientific uncertainty complicates the issue; while
evaluation of the health or environmental risks of air pollutants generally is rife
with uncertainty, mercury science particularly has suffered from significant
knowledge gaps in how it moves and cycles through the environment, as well as
how it impacts human populations.13 However, as will be argued below, scientific
uncertainty has often been used as a discursive weapon to delay or weaken
regulation, and many decisions in mercury regulation specifically can be credibly
attributed to what environmental policy theorist Wendy Wagner defines as the
“science charade” –or regulatory agencies’ use of putatively scientific rationales (in
this case scientific uncertainty) to avoid accountability for underlying policy
decisions.14
This “science charade” is driven largely by the powerful energy utility and
coal lobbies, and pro-industry administrations generally hostile to environmental
regulations. It is enabled by a successful multi-decadal push by anti-regulatory
think tanks, lobbying groups, and advocacy organizations to not only normalize
cost-benefit approaches to managing environmental health, but also do so in a way
that maximizes industry costs and minimizes public benefits of potential regulatory
approaches.15 These actors have crafted effective anti-regulatory, pro-capitalism
“policy stories” that have significantly changed the regulatory landscape,
particularly since the 1980s.16 When the more easily quantifiable costs of mercury
13. See, e.g., CHEMICALS BRANCH, UNITED NATIONS ENTL. PROGRAMME , GLOBAL MERCURY
ASSESSMENT
2013,
at
30
(2013)
[hereinafter
UNEP
MERCURY
REPORT],
http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7984 (Once at the UNEP Document Repository page,
download a PDF version of the report from either of the provided “ENGLISH” or “Show full item
record” links); Matthew O. Gribble et al., Mercury, Selenium and Fish Oils in Marine Food Webs and
Implications for Human Health, J. MARINE BIOLOGY ASS’N U.K. 43, 46 (2015). See generally
Mahamud Subir et al., A Review of Uncertainties in Atmospheric Modeling of Mercury Chemistry I:
Uncertainties in Existing Kinetic Parameters – Fundamental Limitations and the Importance of
Heterogeneous Chemistry, 45 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 5664 (2011).
14. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1617 (1995).
15. See Thomas McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 51 (1998) (“[F]ree
marketeers . . . tend to overestimate the costs and underestimate the benefits of social regulation in their
calculations.”); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2002) (“[A]gencies are heavily dependent upon
the regulated entities for information about compliance costs. Knowing that the agencies are less likely
to impose regulatory options with high price tags . . . regulatees have every incentive to err on the high
side.”).
16. Sidney A. Shapiro, Talking About Regulation: Political Discourse and Regulatory Gridlock, 7
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1, 6, 20–23 (2017). There is a substantial body of work on the intersection
of politics and science in environmental policy, and the dilemmas inherent in technical rulemaking,
particularly in areas of scientific uncertainty. E.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990); JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’
OPPOSITION TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2012); Daniel Sarewitz, What is the “Rightful Place”
of Science?, in THE RIGHTFUL PLACE OF SCIENCE: POLITICS 91 (G. Pascal Zachary ed., 2013); Laurence
H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972).
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emissions control are measured against the far more uncertain risks of those
emissions, it is easy for opponents to justify waiting for greater scientific
certainty.17 Furthermore, and as will be shown below, anti-regulation policymakers
and their allies in the public and private sphere have become especially skilled at
minimizing, weakening, and delaying regulatory measures through indirect
approaches that use a putatively pro-environmental narrative frame while
implementing rules that favor industry. As will also be shown below, in addition to
capitalizing on uncertainties and ambiguities in the science, such actors have also
capitalized on ambiguities in how the law is worded – or by creating ambiguity
when there seems to be little.
The criticism of letting anti-regulatory ideologies drive much of the
rulemaking decisions discussed here is not (or at least not solely) because it tends
to produce anti-environmental regulation, but because it leads to rulemaking
decisions that conflict with the plain text of the law, and have so for decades. While
this article does take a (mostly) implicit normative position in favor of
environmental regulations more protective of humans and the environment, it also
sets out to show that the historical decisions catalogued here are problematic from a
democratic standpoint, independent of one’s views on environmental regulations
specifically. Congress decided to prioritize limiting HAPs with the CAA and its
amendments, and gave EPA certain nondiscretionary duties to do so. When it
comes to EGU-sourced mercury, however, EPA largely failed to execute the law as
written.
This article traces how EGU-sourced mercury escaped regulation for so
long under the CAA despite growing scientific and societal awareness of the
dangers of environmental mercury, even as other anthropogenic sources of the
element became more tightly regulated. While several articles have been published
addressing specific regulatory debates in EGU-sourced mercury regulations,18 this
article examines that regulatory history over the life of the CAA, situating it in the
context of the larger ideological conflicts that grew to define the environmental
policy discourse in the United States following the implementation of the federal
environmental regulatory apparatus, and the various discursive strategies antiregulatory actors have used to prevent the regulation of mercury emissions from
EGUs.19
As political scientist and environmental policy analyst Judith Layzer has
noted, “[a]n exclusive focus on overt policy debates and formal decisions can
obscure ‘the subterranean political processes that shape ground-level policy
effects,’ as well as the ways that powerful actors shape and restrict the political

17. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 76–77
(2010) (paraphrasing quote by former Council of Environmental Quality member J. Christopher
Bernabo as “the degree of scientific certainty demanded is proportional to the cost of doing something
about it”).
18. See articles cited supra note 10.
19. It takes, in other words, a diachronic approach. See Joseph Cooper & David W. Brady, Toward
a Diachronic Analysis of Congress, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 988, 988 (1981) (“[T]he concepts and
measures required to provide an adequate basis [of current structures] need to be developed through
diachronic, rather than merely static, analysis.”).
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agenda, ensuring that some issues are never seriously considered.”20 Using a
similar critical lens, the analysis below examines regulatory debates over EGUsourced mercury as “struggles to define problems and characterize solutions within
a rhetorical and institutional context . . . .”21 This article explores the historical
large-scale regulatory, ideological, and political narratives that have impacted
mercury regulation decisions, with a particular focus on the discursive practices
and tactics used in different policymaking processes to show how different actors
have “define[d] problems and characterize[d] solutions” surrounding
environmental mercury in a way that has served economic and ideological interests,
but not necessarily public health. The analysis taken here seeks not simply to “tell[]
a story” but to do so in a manner that will offer insight into how policy is
developed and how such discursive strategies can push implementation of laws in
directions unforeseen – and unwanted – by the lawmakers who created them.22
Part I below consists of a brief technical background on the current state
of the science of mercury, with a focus on scientific uncertainty in regards to its
environmental cycling and its public health impacts that have impacted regulatory
decisions, and current control options. Part II forms the largest and most central
component of this article, examining the creation of the CAA and the history of
mercury emissions regulation under it, focusing on the legislative and regulatory
battles over EGU-sourced mercury, and how those battles fit into the larger policy
debate about air toxics regulation over the past forty years. It divides this history of
mercury emissions regulations into three different historical periods, representing:
(1) the creation of the CAA until 1989; (2) the passage of the 1990 CAA
Amendments until the 2000 Listing Decision; and (3) the period from the 2000
Listing Decision until the present, analyzing each period in the context of that
larger narrative. Part III concludes by discussing the evolution of regulatory
narratives over EGU-sourced mercury and the historic costs of this inaction in
terms of human health, and offers suggestions to improve future legal and
regulatory decisions about mercury specifically and other air toxics in general by
more openly engaging with questions of value.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Environmental Mercury: Science and Uncertainty

Mercury is ubiquitous in the environment, where it is found in mostly
trace amounts in air and water across the globe. Environmental mercury has both

20. LAYZER supra note 16, at 11 (quoting Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the
Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 243, 243 (2004)).
21. Id.
22. See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 191 (Helen Milner & John Gerard Ruggie eds., 1994). As articulated
by Professor Litfin, the value of a discursive approach to environmental policy analysis is that it can
“offer important insights into the policy process in general and perhaps into future events. . . . It can
alert the analyst to certain misconceptions that might arise, and it can also alert the practitioner to the
importance of alternative discursive strategies.”

132

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 58

natural and anthropogenic sources; natural sources include volcanoes, weathering
of mercury-containing rocks and soils, and wildfires, while anthropogenic sources
include fossil fuel combustion, gold and other metal production, cement
production, waste incineration, and various industrial processes.23 Environmental
mercury levels have increased steadily since the mid-19th century, almost certainly
due to human activities,24 though levels may be declining since the 1980s.25
Organic mercury compounds pose the greatest health risk, particularly since they
tend to be concentrated to unsafe levels up the food chain in marine and aquatic
environments.
Coal combustion is the largest single source of anthropogenic mercury
emissions to the atmosphere.26 Coal-fired EGUs are significant emitters of
mercury, though mercury content of coal varies depending on coal type and
geographic origin.27 One recent estimate of worldwide mercury emissions from
stationary combustion (most of it coal combustion), places emissions at
approximately 970 tpy, with 79 tons originating in North America.28 In 1997, EPA
estimated EGU-sourced mercury emissions in the United States at 47 tpy,29 a
number that was used as a baseline in EGU mercury emissions regulatory debates
through about 2011, though subsequently other CAA regulations and state
regulations were projected to reduce mercury emissions to an estimated 29 tpy in
2016.30

23. Nicola Pirrone et al., Global Mercury Emissions to the Atmosphere from Anthropogenic and
Natural Sources, 10 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 5951, 5952–53 (2010). See generally
William H. Schroeder & John Munthe, Atmospheric Mercury—An Overview, 32 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T
810 (1998) (providing an overview of all major aspects of mercury in the atmosphere).
24. See D. H. Landers et al., Using Lake Sediment Mercury Flux Ratios to Evaluate the Regional
and Continental Dimensions of Mercury Deposition in Arctic and Boreal Ecosystems, 32 ATMOSPHERIC
ENV’T 919, 919–20, 928 (1998).
25. UNEP MERCURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 16 tbl.Emissions to air. However, different
methodological approaches to quantifying both anthropogenic and natural mercury emissions
inventories over the years complicates determining long-term trends. See id. at 16.
26. Pacyna et al., supra note 7, at 2488 (“[C]oal burning is the largest anthropogenic source of
mercury emission to the atmosphere.”). In terms of mercury emissions to all media, including land and
water, artisanal gold mining is estimated to be a larger source, at approximately 1,102 tons per year
(tpy), though only about 441 tpy is estimated to be emissions to the atmosphere. Pirrone et al., supra
note 23, at 5956. For the sake of consistency, I have converted the metric tons used in this and certain
other references to American short tons throughout this article.
27. The estimated worldwide average mercury content of coal is in the neighborhood of 100–400
parts per billion, though it can vary from 1 part per billion to 330 parts per million, or by a factor of
330,000. Parisa A. Ariya et al., Mercury Physiochemical and Biogeochemical Transformation in the
Atmosphere and at Atmospheric Interfaces: A Review and Future Directions, 115 CHEMICAL REVIEWS
3760 (2015).
28. Pacyna et al., supra note 7, at 2493 tbl.3.
29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter 1997
EPA MERCURY REPORT], Vol. I, at 3-6 tbl.3-1 (combining mercury emission totals for Coal, Oil, and
Natural gas combustion sources for the total mercury emissions produced by Utility boiler combustion
sources) All volumes of the 1997 EPA Mercury Report can be found at
https://www.epa.gov/mercury/mercury-study-report-congress.
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-009, REVISED TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT:
NATIONAL-SCALE ASSESSMENT OF MERCURY RISK TO POPULATIONS WITH HIGH CONSUMPTION OF
SELF-CAUGHT FRESHWATER FISH 8 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Technical Support Document or 2011
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Toxicity and absorption of mercury depends on both the form of mercury
as well as the route of exposure, but most forms are neurotoxic. Organomercury
compounds like methylmercury, the kind most frequently found in fish, tend to be
the most toxic. 31 Prenatal exposure to organic mercury can interfere with brain
development; high prenatal doses have been linked to severe intellectual
disabilities, blindness, seizure disorders, and deafness. Even low doses may cause
more subtle cognitive impairments, such as reduced motor function and lower IQ.32
Elemental mercury is less dangerous through ingestion or contact, but inhaling high
levels of mercury vapors can lead to adverse health effects, including tremors and
aggression.33
Despite significant epidemiological research into the impact of consuming
methylmercury-containing fish, the level at which methylmercury causes health
impacts in human populations is still unknown. Numerous longitudinal studies
have been carried out, with frustratingly varied results between populations, a fact
which has been a common tactic to forestall regulation.34
B.

Mercury Emissions Control

Due to its low concentration and chemical characteristics, controlling
mercury emissions from combustion sources like EGUs can be difficult.35 EPA has
identified four general control techniques: (1) pre-combustion pollution prevention
measures (such as product substitution or process modification); (2) coal cleaning;
(3) alternative approaches (e.g., emissions trading or use taxes); and (4) flue gas
treatment technologies.36 Because almost all coal contains mercury, and because

TSD], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/revisedmercurytsd.pdf (“The [EPA’s] estimated Hg
emissions from U.S. EGUs in 2016 . . . is 29 tons, after other CAA related regulations are fully
implemented.). The 29 tons figure represents a baseline figure not reflecting any mercury-specific EGU
pollution controls. Id.
31. For example, in one widely publicized incident, a chemist at Dartmouth accidentally spilled
several drops of dimethylmercury, a particularly toxic form, on her latex-gloved hand and died from
mercury poisoning within a year. David W. Nierenberg et al., Delayed Cerebellar Disease and Death
After Accidental Exposure to Dimethylmercury, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1672 (1998).
32. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF METHYLMERCURY 17 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 NRC REPORT].
33. Thomas W. Clarkson et al., The Toxicology of Mercury – Current Exposures and Clinical
Manifestations, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1731, 1733 (2003).
34. A longitudinal study is one where measurements or observations are made of the same subject
at different periods of time over a study.
35. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-47, CLEAN AIR ACT: MERCURY CONTROL
TECHNOLOGIES AT COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS HAVE ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS 3 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 GAO REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1047.pdf
(“Mercury is emitted in such low concentrations that its removal and measurement are particularly
difficult, and it is emitted in several forms. . . . “). The 2009 GAO REPORT provides a nontechnical
review of mercury emissions reduction technologies. More recently, UNEP has released a draft
guidance document on mercury emissions controls. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVTL.
PROGRAMME, GUIDANCE ON BEST AVAILABLE TECHNIQUES AND BEST ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES TO
CONTROL MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS AND COAL-FIRED INDUSTRIAL
BOILERS (2015).
36. 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at ES-8. Coal cleaning is the physical or
chemical removal of impurities from coal such as sulfur (to which mercury is often bound). Id. at ES-9.
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coal cleaning (removing mercury pre-combustion) has limited effectiveness,37
technical approaches typically focus on developing flue gas treatment technologies
to remove mercury from flue gas after combustion but before it leaves the
smokestack.
The technical and economic feasibility of using specific mercury control
technologies at a given EGU are dependent on the type of coal used, boiler design,
and the types of pollution control technologies already in place, though the U.S.
Government Accounting Office (GAO) has predicted that sorbent-injection systems
will be able to substantially reduce mercury emissions at a relatively low cost for
most plants.38
C.

Early Legal and Regulatory Approaches to Mercury Health Risks

While by the early 20th century numerous laws regulating mercury had
been implemented at the state level, they focused solely on protecting the public
from direct exposure to mercury products.39 No such regulations existed at the
federal level.40 In the wake of the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, and in
response to a public that demanded concerted action by the federal government to
mitigate pollution, the then-existing patchwork of state and federal approaches to
pollution control was supplanted in large part with more comprehensive federal
frameworks. The new federal laws would largely supplant rather than supplement
traditional tort claims over environmental contaminants.41
Even before the creation of EPA and the environmental laws it would
implement and enforce, mercury ranked highly as a contaminant of particular
concern; members of the Senate held two days of hearings in the summer of 1970
on the threat environmental mercury posed to both humans and the environment.42

Flue gas is the byproduct of combustion emitted to the atmosphere, which can treated before it is
released from the stack. Id. at ES-11to ES-13.
37. See id. at 6-1 (“The available data on coal cleaning indicate that mercury reductions ranged
from zero to 64 percent. The average reduction was 21 percent.”).
38. 2009 GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 27.
39. E.g., N.C. Revisal of 1908, ch. 95, § 4489 (1908) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or
deliver to any person . . . [t]he compounds and salts of . . . mercury,” except as provided by statute.);
MINN. STAT. § 2337 (1905) (“No person, otherwise than on a physician’s written prescription, shall sell
at retail . . . mercury . . . without affixing to the package or receptacle containing the same a label
conspicuously bearing the word ‘Poison’. . . . “); Act of Apr. 1, 1912, ch. 351, § 1, 1912 N.J. Laws 603
(requiring every physician to report instances of occupationally related mercury poising to the state
board of health).
40. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 outlawed the sale of “adulterated” food in general, but
mercury was not specifically listed as an adulterant in the statute or the implementing regulations of the
time. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Act of June 25,
1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
41. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (“[T]he Clean Air Act
and EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbondioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 22 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water Act fully pre-empted federal
common law of nuisance in terms of ocean pollution).
42. Effects of Mercury on Man and the Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy,
Nat. Res., and the Env’t of the S. Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong. (1970).
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Similarly, in the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) first annual report, the
CEQ recognized toxic mercury pollution as “a serious national problem.”43
II.

MERCURY REGULATION UNDER CAA

Most of the contemporary debate and controversy over regulating mercury
emissions has taken place in the context of the CAA, arguably the most
important—and most fought-over—federal statute arising in that “golden age” of
federal environmental law. The CAA and its implementing regulations
promulgated by EPA have been the primary regulatory instruments through which
the federal government (and by delegation, state governments) regulates
atmospheric emissions of pollutants and potential pollutants from both stationary
and mobile sources.
The CAA replaced earlier, more limited federal air pollution measures that
had been created in the preceding decades in response to growing public concern
over air quality. While some states had already taken steps to statutorily abate such
pollutants,44 these actions were hampered by air pollutants’ movement across state
borders.45 The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 was the first federal regulation to
address air pollution, providing funding for research and technical assistance;
however, as its drafter reassured his colleagues, it was not intended to intrude on
the states’ authority to control air pollution.46 While the federal government’s
advisory role was maintained in amendments to that act in 1960 and 1962, growing
public (and legislative) support for federal intervention into pollution abatement led
to the passage of the Air Quality Act of 1963, amended in 1967, which allowed the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to set emissions criteria. However,
the Department’s enforcement ability was limited to requesting the Department of
Justice bring suit for pollution abatement, and even then could only request such a
suit after a long series of administrative procedures had been followed.47
43. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 52
(1970), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED062109.pdf ; see also Addition to List of HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg.
5931 (Mar. 31, 1971). The CEQ was created by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L.
91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 854 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2012)). The Council was created
to, inter alia, advise the President on environmental matters, and assist him in preparing the required
annual Environmental Quality Report Council, which was required by statute until 1997, when that
requirement was removed pursuant to the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-66, § 1091(b), 109 Stat. 707 (1995); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970) (prior NEPA annual
report requirement).
44. STANLEY E. DEGLER, STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 1 (rev. ed. 1970) (“In 1970, all
50 states had laws to control air pollution.”). By 1963 only 14 states had air pollution control laws at a
state-wide level, id. at 2, though after the passage of the CAA of 1967 this would grow to 46 by 1969.
Id. at 1. However, not all states with authority to regulate air pollution used that authority. Only four
states (Alabama, Maine, Nebraska, and South Dakota) had no statutory authority under state law to
regulate air pollution, though they could do so under nuisance statutes. See id. at 1-32 (describing air
pollution laws in all fifty states); see also Harold W. Kennedy & Andrew O. Porter, Air Pollution: Its
Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV. 854 (1955).
45. See generally Edmund S. Muskie, Role of the Federal Government in Air Pollution Control, 10
ARIZ. L. REV. 17 (1969) (discussing the difficulties of establishing jurisdictional responsibility in the
field of pollution control).
46. CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR POLLUTION 94–96 (1998).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)–(f) (1964).
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Public concerns over pollutants during this time period tended to focus on
more visible pollutants, with priority to chemical components or precursors of
highly visible, predominately urban air pollution, particularly the ozone relating to
photochemical smog, as well as particulates and sulfur dioxide (SO2), a noxious,
terrible-smelling compound known for causing lung irritation and illness.48
However, through the 1970s, scientists, policymakers, and the general public had
become more aware of invisible toxics, thanks in large part to Rachel Carson’s
seminal 1962 work, Silent Spring,49 which likely helped drive creation of the HAP
provisions of the CAA.
Dissatisfied with what was perceived as ineffective regulation under the
earlier Clean Air Act of 1963 (and its 1967 amendments), and faced with growing
clamor from the states for federal intervention, Congress essentially rewrote the air
pollution regulatory scheme in 1970 with the CAA, implementing a comprehensive
statute which, among other things, established procedures for EPA to set and
enforce emissions standards and strengthened enforcement mechanisms.
Regulation of mercury seems fairly straightforward—the dangers of environmental
mercury were fairly well known then, and a Senate committee report during the
drafting process expressly suggested mercury as a possible future regulated
substance.50 However, attempts to do so under the CAA have been piecemeal and,
when it comes to EGU-sourced mercury, unsuccessful for most of the CAA’s
history. The CAA and its implementing regulations contain several different
mechanisms for limiting air pollutants from both stationary and mobile sources,
though only the stationary source provisions are of significant relevance to mercury
regulations.51 An enormously complex statute, the CAA contains numerous
provisions applying to different pollutants, areas, and sources; addressed below are
the primary regulatory tools for governing general pollutants from stationary
sources like EGUs.

48. See Bailey, supra note 46, at 129. See generally Matthias Dörries, The Transmutation of Ozone
in the Early 1970s, in TOXIC AIRS: BODY, PLACE, PLANET IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (James Rodger
Fleming &Ann Johnson eds., 2014) (exploring the debate over ozone from the 1950s, with a particular
focus on the 1970s).
49. Though focused on pesticides, particularly DDT, the book held one reference to mercury,
referring to it as a “poison” used in some crabgrass killers. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 80
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994) (1962).
50. ENVTL. POLICY DIV, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. & LIBRARY OF CONG., S. COMM. ON PUB.
WORKS, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 133 (1974)
(“Examples of substances which the Administration informed the Senate were likely to be controlled
under [section 112 include] mercury. . . . “).
51. Unless otherwise specified, the general provisions described here have been a part of the CAA
from its passage in 1970 until the time of this writing, with cites to the statute based on the present U.S.
Code. Mercury is not emitted from mobile sources in any significant quantities, so provisions of the
CAA applying strictly to mobile sources are not discussed.
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Pollutant Regulation Provisions of the CAA Applying to Stationary
Sources
1.

CAA Section 108: National Ambient Air Quality Standards

To control the ubiquitous, large-scale pollutants like ozone, SO2 and
nitrogen oxides (NOX) which affect air quality over large areas, Congress enacted
CAA Section 108,52 which requires the creation of state- or EPA-designated air
quality regions and the designation of national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) for pollutants, which “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare; [and] the presence of which in the ambient air results from
numerous diverse mobile or stationary sources . . . .”53 Such standards restrict the
level of criteria pollutants permitted in the ambient air in a region, with states then
directly regulating sources within their jurisdiction through State Implementation
Plans (SIPs) tailored to meet those NAAQS requirements.54 Failing to meet
NAAQS deadlines, or submitting SIPs that do not meet EPA approval, may subject
states to potential penalties.55 While nothing in the CAA’s original text precluded
mercury from being regulated as a criteria pollutant, regulation under Section112
(discussed in Section IIA3 below) as a HAP shortly after passage barred mercury’s
designation as a criteria pollutant, and the 1990 Amendments firmly established
that mercury emissions, including EGU emissions, were to be regulated under
Section 112.56 Since the CAA’s passage, Section 108 has never been used or
proposed as a direct mercury regulatory mechanism, though as discussed in Section
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012). Both primary and secondary standards are set, with the primary
standards designed to protect public health “allowing an adequate margin of safety,” and less stringent
secondary standards aimed at protecting the “public welfare.” Id. § 7409. As currently codified, the
distinction is not particularly important since air quality regions are considered non-attainment under
CAA section 107(d) if they fail to meet either primary or secondary standards. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)–(B).
54. In 1971, EPA promulgated regulations designating six NAAQS criteria pollutants: SO2,
particulates, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and NOX. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186
(Apr. 30, 1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.11). In 1978, EPA designated lead as a criteria
pollutant, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct. 5, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.12), but has not designated any
additional criteria pollutants since then.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012). The NAAQS deadlines have been extended repeatedly through the
years, and with the 1990 Amendments “nonattainment areas” not meeting NAAQS requirements are
classified into separate categories, with requirements and compliance deadlines differing depending on
category. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 181–193, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511–7515 (2012)). The 1990 Amendments also added the requirement that in
nonattainment areas even old sources must be required to use reasonably available control technology
(“RACT”) to control criteria pollutant emissions. Id. § 182 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (2012)).
56. A separate but related provision is CAA Part C, designated as Prevention of Significant
Deterioration of Air Quality (“PSD”) which requires EPA and state governments to implement
additional permitting requirements ensuring that air quality is not degraded in other areas that have
attained NAAQS standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492. As originally implemented in the 1977
Amendments, PSD restrictions could be placed on non-criteria pollutants, including mercury. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470–7491 (1988); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 361 n.90 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(noting in dicta that “the fact that emission of mercury is not [regulated under section 112 does not]
mean[] that mercury is not a pollutant subject to regulation [under PSD].”). However, following the
1990 Amendments, section 112 HAPs are excluded from regulation under the PSD provisions. 42
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(6) (2012).
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II(D)(2)(d) below, controls for some types of criteria pollutants can also reduce
mercury emissions as a co-benefit.
2.

CAA Section 111: New Source Pollution Standards

While Section 108 allows states some flexibility in the actual emissions
standards set in SIPs so long as the region’s ambient air quality goals can be met,
Section 111 requires EPA to directly regulate emissions standards for new sources
of pollutants “caus[ing], or contribut[ing] significantly to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”57 A “new source”
under the statute means one that is constructed or modified in a way that increases
its emission of any air pollutant after EPA has set emissions standards.58 Standards
are based on the best emissions reduction system achievable, taking into account
costs, and energy and non-air environmental impacts.59 The section provides that
the states may implement and enforce EPA’s new source standards through SIPs,
though Section 111(c)(2) allows EPA to directly enforce standards for those new
sources.60 The sole major attempt to regulate EGU-sourced mercury under Section
111 NSPS provisions was under the Bush-era EPA’s Clear Skies Plan, discussed in
more detail in Section D1 below.
Under the NSPS sections as originally enacted, EPA could also apply the
new source emissions standards to already-existing sources, but only if those
pollutants were not already regulated as criteria pollutants (under Section 108) or
HAPs (under Section 112); this provision was intended primarily to serve as a
“‘gap-filling’ measure for ‘pollutants which cannot be controlled through the
ambient air quality standards and which are not hazardous substances.’”61 Whether
that provision survived the 1990 Amendments without substantive change is
uncertain at the time of this writing. Due to a legislative error arising out of the
1990 Amendments and discussed in more detail in Section D1 below, Section
111(d) currently may preclude regulating those sources that are already regulated
as HAP, even if the specific pollutant itself is not regulated.62

57. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). “New sources” under Section 111 refers to stationary sources
constructed or modified after standards of performance have been promulgated. Id. § 7411(a)(2).
58. Id. § 7411(a)(2)–(4).
59. Id. § 7411(a)(1)–(2).
60. Id. § 7411(c)(1).
61. Frank B. Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the Control of
Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 233 (1986) (quoting A legislative History of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1970) 227 (statement of Sen.
Muskie)).
62. The Senate and the House of Representatives passed different versions of section 111(d) in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The Senate version prevents EPA from regulating pollutants under
section 111(d) that are also regulated under section 112, while the House version prevents EPA from
regulating sources that are regulated under section 111(d). While the issue came up in West Virginia v.
EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 27, 2016) (en banc), regarding the Clean Power Plan, it has not yet
been resolved. See Andrew Childers, Clean Power Plan Scrutinized Through Lens of Supreme Court,
BLOOMBERG BNA: ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.bna.com/clean-power-plann57982077646/.
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CAA Section 112: Hazardous Air Pollutants

Historically, however, the CAA sections most relevant to mercury
regulation are the HAP provisions under Section 112.63 This section mandates that
EPA set emissions standards for HAPs that pose a “threat of adverse human health
effects . . . or adverse environmental effects . . . .”64 The statutory language is
ambiguous as to whether a pollutant should be regulated as a NAAQS criteria
pollutant or as a HAP, though throughout the lifetime of the CAA ubiquitous
pollutants that are usually dangerous in large quantities have been defined as
criteria pollutants.65 Contaminants that are significantly more toxic in smaller
amounts have been more often defined as HAPs.66 As with NSPS, EPA sets
specific national emissions standards itself rather than through individualized SIPs,
though this does not preclude state-level emissions standards that are more
restrictive,67 and the states can and typically do handle permitting and enforcement
regarding compliance with the HAP regulations.68
The 1970 version of the original CAA required EPA to designate a
substance as a HAP if it “may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.”69 While as
written it did not expressly permit EPA to limit HAP regulations by source, shortly
after the statute’s creation, EPA interpreted it as doing so,70 and in 1990, Congress
codified this interpretation.71 Unlike with Section 111, all sources of emissions are

63. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
64. Id. § 7412(b)(2).
65. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 46–49
(2004).
66. See Williamson et al., supra note 8 at 705 (“Hazardous air pollution regulation focuses
primarily on protecting individuals downwind of toxic releases from direct exposure.”); John D.
Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens under Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 108 (1985) (“The toxic air pollutants to be regulated under
section 112 were supposed to be more dangerous . . . than the criteria pollutants.”).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7).
68. The initial version of the CAA provided that “[i]f the Administrator finds the [submitted] State
procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority he has under this [Act] to implement
and enforce such standards. . . . “ 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7412(d)(1) (2012)). The CAA of 1990 reserved the right of the Federal government to delegate
implementation and enforcement procedures to the states, but provided more detailed information on
state responsibility, and provided for research and management assistance.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1977).
70. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A COLLECTION OF LEGAL OPINIONS, Vol. I: DECEMBER 1970DECEMBER. 1973, at 100 (1975) (“[W]e believe that §112 standards should be made applicable only to
designated sources. Whenever it appears that additional sources may emit the pollutant in question in
unsafe amounts, we will immediately investigate the situation and propose and promulgate regulations
as necessary to protect the public health.”). EPA’s decision to list HAPs as limited to those from specific
sources appears to have gone largely unchallenged, though the President’s Council on Environmental
Quality originally took a different interpretation. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1971), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED055922.pdf
(“Asbestos, mercury, and beryllium have been designated as hazardous air pollutants for which Federal
emissions standards, applicable to all sources, will be promulgated.”) (emphasis added).
71. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
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regulated, whether old or new.72 When setting those limits EPA was required to,
within 180 days, propose standards that were “at the level which in [EPA’s]
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such
hazardous air pollutant,” with no allowances for cost.73 Even when, as shown
below, the 1990 amendments liberalized how emissions standards were
determined, the focus of CAA Section 112 has remained on public health.
When first passed, Congress clearly intended the CAA to force aggressive
EPA regulation of HAPs under CAA Section 112(a)(1).74 The Nixon
Administration was less enthusiastic, recommending unsuccessfully during
Conference proceedings that the entirety of Section 112 be removed.75 In practice,
however, the first two decades of the CAA’s existence saw little action taken by
EPA to designate and control substances as HAPs.
B.

Regulating Mercury as a HAP: 1971-1989
1.

Mercury Emissions and HAP Regulations in the CAA’s First Decade

Despite the nominal strength of the HAP provisions, their reliance on the
initiative of the executive branch quickly proved a barrier to regulation. Shortly
after the creation of both EPA and the CAA, the Nixon administration, worried
particularly about the cost of CAA regulations, quickly put in institutional
measures to limit EPA’s effective power by allowing the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) a significant oversight role.76 Nixon’s willingness to limit
EPA’s effectiveness so quickly after its creation was likely a result of personal
frustration; after disappointing results from the 1970 Congressional elections, and
resentful over a perceived lack of credit from environmentalists for what he
accomplished, Nixon likely saw far less political gain to be had from siding with
those environmentalists of whom he characterized in a meeting with auto industry
executives as interested in “destroying the system.”77 The CAA especially was
“[c]onservative critics’ main target during the 1970s.”78

72. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988).
73. See id. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (no mention of cost).
74. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B); see also Graham, supra note 66, at 110, 131, 147–50.
75. Graham, supra note 66, at 106 & n.39.
76. Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 132–33 (1991); see Robert F. Durant, WHEN
GOVERNMENT REGULATES ITSELF: EPA, TVA, AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE 1970S 26–44 (1985).
77. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77 (2004); J. BROOKS FLIPPEN,
NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 142 (2000). For a more favorable view of Nixon’s environmental
legacy, see Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon Administration, 26 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 185 (1996). The first EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, would later state that Nixon
was incurious about EPA and the issues it addressed, noting, “he [Nixon] never asked me about
anything going on in EPA. Never.” Michael Gorn, William D. Ruckelshaus: Oral History Interview,
EPA
(Jan.
1993),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/william-d-ruckelshaus-oral-historyinterview.html.
78. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 63.
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Nevertheless, in 1971, EPA included mercury in its first proposed list of
HAPs, but proposed standards only for chlor-alkali and ore processing facilities.79
EPA failed to promulgate actual emissions standards within the statutory deadline
following listing, finally doing so in 1973 after being sued by the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF).80 EPA’s final rule applied only to the proposed sources, and
then only to prevent emissions of 1 ppm or over—in other words, levels that were
considered high enough to be potentially dangerous outside any bioaccumulation
process.81 In implementing this rule, EPA acknowledged that methylmercury was
“by far the most hazardous mercury compound, particularly via the ingestion of
fish,” but declined to regulate source mercury emissions based on whether they
increased environmental mercury as a whole, offering as a rationale that “[c]urrent
data on the environmental transport of mercury do not permit a clear assessment of
the effect of mercury emissions into . . . aquatic and terrestrial environments.”82
When the first HAP standards for mercury were promulgated there existed
a large and proliferating body of research on bioaccumulation and
biomagnification, health effects, and an understanding among the scientific and
engineering community that EGUs emitted mercury in significant amounts.83
However, the same time period also saw EGUs having difficulty meeting the
electricity needs of the public, shortfalls that many at the time believed would be
exacerbated by environmental regulations.84 By the time the final rule was
promulgated in April 1973, the economic outlook was grim, as the stock market
had crashed a few months before, and an energy crisis was clearly on the horizon.
When Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the
country was firmly in the grips of that crisis. While environmentalists had some
hope that Ford would be friendly to environmental initiatives given his experience
as a federal park ranger, he took little action on the environmental front either for
or against regulation, ending with an “environmental slate” that was “clean, albeit
empty.”85

79. List of HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971) (listing mercury as HAP); Nat’l Emission
Standards for HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,239 (Dec. 7, 1971) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposing
emissions standards).
80. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,173 (D.D.C. 1973) (ordering EPA to
promulgate emissions standards for asbestos, beryllium, and mercury, within sixty days from the entry
of the court’s order); 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8826 (Apr. 6, 1973).
81. 38 Fed. Reg. at 8824.
82. Id. at 8824–25.
83. VICTOR W. LAMBOU, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF
MERCURY EMISSIONS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 14–19, 28 (1972),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/9101H8V5.PDF?Dockey=9101H8V5.PDF. This EPA report was
drafted for an international working group on mercury.
84. Philip M. Boffey, Energy Crisis: Environmental Issue Exacerbates Power Supply Problem, 168
SCI. 1554, 1556–57 (1970).
85. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER & GARY BRYNER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: DOMESTIC &
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 51 (Beth A. Gillett et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). While in 1976, Ford did sign the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012)) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901–6992K (2012)), both passed
with veto-proof majorities in the House and Senate.
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In 1974, upon petition from the EDF, EPA proposed amending the HAP
list to include among regulated sources of mercury incineration and drying of
wastewater treatment plant sludges, limiting mercury emissions from those sources
to 3,200 grams a day, which EPA calculated would ensure the same 1 ppm mercury
limits on ambient air adjacent to the source.86 Again, while recognizing the
potential danger of bioconcentration of environmental mercury in fish, it still
purported to find too much scientific uncertainty to take action on that issue: “The
Agency has become increasingly concerned about the total environmental burden
of mercury, however, and is initiating studies to determine how this aspect can
most effectively be addressed under the provisions of the Clean Air Act and other
authorities.”87
On October 14, 1975, EPA published its final rule governing
mercury emissions from wastewater treatment plant sludges.88 It noted that during
the comment period some participants had suggested other sources, including coalfired EGUs, be included, but rejected such an approach, stating that none of those
sources “emit mercury in such quantities that they are likely to cause the ambient
mercury concentration to exceed one microgram per cubic meter.”89 In 1987, EPA
implemented a minor administrative rule to the mercury standards for chlor-alkali
plants,90 and again considered (or purported to consider) but rejected a
commenter’s request that the agency re-evaluate the decision not to regulate EGUsourced mercury emissions, as well as a separate request that EPA generally “take
into account total human exposure to mercury, including deposited mercury in its
more toxic methylated forms.”91 There would be no significant mercury emissions
regulations until after the 1990 Amendments; EPA took little action during the
Carter administration on regulating HAPs, a decision that disappointed
environmentalists,92 though Carter did successfully see CAA renewed, and even
strengthened in some places.93 During the Carter administration, the National
86. Proposed Amendments to Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,064, 38,067
(Oct. 25, 1974) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
87. Id.
88. Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,297–98 (Oct. 14, 1975)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
89. Id. at 48,298. However, EPA’s own 1972 report, which reviewed research on mercury
emissions, does not paint a particularly disparate picture between the environmental effects of mercury
emissions of EGUs and wastewater sludge incineration; see LAMBOU, supra note 83.
90. Nat’l Emissions Standards for HAPs; Review and Revision of the Standards for Mercury, 52
Fed. Reg. 8724–28 (Mar. 19, 1987).
91. Id. at 8725. While conceding that some coal sources had mercury levels of 8 ppm for
subbituminous coal and 3.3 ppm for bituminous coal, and conceding also that under worst case
scenarios a large coal-fired plant using 8 ppm coal would reach a ground concentration of 1.0 μg/m3, the
agency concluded that “typically, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants are expected to be
well below the ambient guideline level.” Id. EPA’s rationale seems somewhat inconsistent with the fact
that EPA had been willing to regulate mercury emissions from sludge incineration even though it
“estimate[d] that the largest mercury emissions from an existing sludge incinerator . . . is approximately
one-sixth of the maximum allowable emission.” 40 Fed. Reg. at 48,298.
92. Graham, supra note 66, at 112.
93. E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, § 106, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012)); see also LAYZER, supra note 16, at 68 As noted above, the PSD provisions
were implemented through the 1977 Amendment. See sources cited supra note 56.
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Research Council released a comprehensive assessment of environmental mercury
and its possible health impacts, warning that mercury emissions from EGUs were
of “special concern,” since such emissions were “currently uncontrolled and the use
of coal [was] expected to increase significantly.”94
Despite EPA’s refusal to consider bioaccumulation and biomagnification
processes when regulating mercury under CAA, during the 1970s both EPA and
FDA did consider it in other contexts. In 1973, the FDA promulgated an action
level of .5 ug/g of mercury (or .5 ppm) for seafood, allowing them to remove
seafood meeting that action level from the market.95 EPA’s own position on
mercury-based pesticides and fungicides played out far differently than it did for
EGU-sourced mercury. The Fungicide, Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
of 1947 (FIFRA)96 originally allowed the Department of Agriculture to suspend
registrations of pesticides that posed an “imminent hazard” to the public, though
the notoriously agribusiness-friendly department did not vigorously exercise that
power.97 When that suspension power was transferred to EPA,98 the agency quickly
took action to cancel the registration of mercury-containing pesticides and
fungicides based substantially on their environmental and health impacts, primarily
based on their tendency to bioaccumulate and biomagnify through food webs.99
2.

1980-1989: The Anti-Regulation Backlash and the Reagan
Revolution

Whatever the evolving scientific consensus stated, the 1980 election of the
fiercely anti-regulation Ronald Reagan made serious oversight of EGU emissions
by the executive branch extremely unlikely; the 1980s would see particularly
bruising legislative fights over environmental protections, especially those
regarding air pollution.100 The seeds of the anti-regulatory backlash had been
planted in the 1960s and 1970s through the development of a “conservative
infrastructure” in the form of think tanks and lobbying organizations funded by
industry and staffed by fiercely pro-business conservative intellectuals. In President
Reagan, those organizations found a champion willing to fight enthusiastically and
publicly against environmental protection measures.

94. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AN ASSESSMENT OF MERCURY IN THE ENVIRONMENT 29 (1978).
95. See Kelly Joyce, Is Tuna Safe? A Sociological Analysis of Federal Fish Advisories, in
MERCURY POLLUTION: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY TREATMENT 79 (Sharon L. Zuber & Michael C.
Newman eds., 2011).
96. Fungicide, Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012)).
97. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b), (c) (2012).
98. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(8)(i), 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, (Oct. 6, 1970), reprinted
in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
99. See Certain Products Containing Mercury: Cancellation of Registration, 37 Fed. Reg. 6419–20
(Mar. 29, 1972); see also Chapman Chemical Co., 1 E.A.D. 199, 214 (1976) (“[I]n the aquatic
environment . . . highly toxic methyl mercury by natural biomethylation poses a significant risk to man
and the environment. I am persuaded that registrants’ evidence in support of the opposite suggests a
greater optimism than scientific caution. Based on the evidence as a whole, I cannot share that
optimism.”).
100. See Graham, supra note 66, at 113–15.
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Accordingly, while Nixon had sought political capital from a public
display of environmental advocacy, Reagan in many ways did the opposite. He
intentionally and publicly attacked environmental regulations as a pro-business
regulatory reformer.101 Under his administration, EPA officials were heavily
recruited from the private sector, including regulated industries, and selected for
their “ideological purity” by the White House rather than screened by EPA’s
professional personnel. Reagan’s choice for EPA Administrator, the notoriously
anti-regulation Anne Gorsuch, slashed her own budget, relaxed environmental
regulations, and reduced enforcement actions before being forced to resign.102
Faced with significant public and congressional scrutiny over the state in
which Gorsuch left EPA, the Reagan administration attempted to bolster its
environmental credibility by re-appointing William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first
administrator, as Gorsuch’s successor. Ruckelshaus, a moderate Republican, was
fairly well regarded in both political and environmental circles.103 However, he was
also highly concerned with the potential costs of environmental regulation in
general, particularly regarding toxics. His second term as EPA administrator
eventually received a mixed review from environmentalists and pro-regulation
politicians, though he was considered by some to be the most environmentallyfriendly EPA administrator possible under the Reagan administration.104 On HAP
regulation, he did little other than promise impending regulatory measures that in
large part failed to materialize. In a statement given to the House Subcommittee on
November 7, 1983, Ruckelshaus addressed the failure of EPA to regulate many
proposed HAPs by blaming in large part the language of §112 itself:
In implementing the provisions of section 112, the EPA has had
to make some uncomfortable compromises. We took it as given
that Congress did not intend for us to virtually ban a number of
major industrial chemicals. We have, therefore, made judgments
about safety, about the appropriate balancing of risks and cost
. . . . We believe that we are in accord with the real intent of

101. See LAYZER, supra note 16, at 9. See generally Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig,
Environmental Policy in the Reagan Presidency, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 415, 426–33 (1984) (discussing the
Reagan administration’s environmental policy and regulation reform).
102. See Kraft & Vig, supra note 101, at 426-31. Gorsuch’s resignation was prompted by the
increasingly public battles with Congress and negative press focused attention that focused not only on
her extreme antipathy towards environmental regulations but also on charges of political favoritism and
corruption JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 57–58 (1995).
103. Ruckelshaus’ reputation for integrity (Nixon referred to him as “Mr. Clean”) led to him being
appointed acting director of the FBI, and then Deputy Attorney General, as the Watergate affair began to
take its toll on the Nixon White House. See FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 397–99 (1995).
104. See Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A.; Apres Ruckelshaus le Deluge?, NY TIMES (Dec. 3, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/03/us/epa-apres-ruckelshaus-le-deluge.html
(“Without
paradox,
spokesmen for groups that had been his severest critics expressed dismay and anxiety over Mr.
Ruckelshaus’s impending departure . . . he was the best Administrator they could hope for while Mr.
Reagan was in the White House.”).
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Congress and that the flexibility to balance risks and costs is an
essential part of EPA’s ability to carry out its mission.105
Though Ruckelshaus argued EPA had been operating as it expected
Congress wanted it to, Congress would later disagree.106 Materials provided to
Congress indicate that in the early 1980s at least some EPA employees intended to
carry out health assessments of a number of potential HAPs from sources not
already regulated, but at the same time the agency also appeared to intentionally
put up procedural roadblocks to delay those assessments.107 In 1983, the GAO
investigated EPA’s management of regulation under Section 112 in light of its
failure to list additional HAPs, including thirty-seven priority pollutants already
identified by EPA.108 In its report, the GAO concluded that a number of
institutional barriers prevented effective regulation under Section 112, including
extensive internal reviews of health assessment documents, a lengthy Science
Advisory Board review process, and EPA’s insistence on collecting “economic and
technological factors” impacting HAP regulation – which the GAO noted were
improper under the statute in light of the fact that Section 112 did not provide for
those kinds of analyses.109
3.

Mercury and Toxics Regulations During the CAA’s First Two
Decades: Context and Conclusions

While environmentalists hoped that CAA would significantly limit what
industry could emit to the air, when it came to HAPs that optimism proved
unwarranted through the CAA’s first two decades. While restrictions on criteria
pollutants proved somewhat effective, restrictions on HAPs were scant. Legitimate
scientific uncertainty was certainly a factor in this inaction; the health and
environmental effects of toxics, particularly those like mercury, which are naturally
present in trace amounts and undergo complex transformations in both the
environment and organisms, are difficult to detect. The inherent statutory
requirements of CAA Section 112 also likely led in some cases to bureaucratic
paralysis; as noted above, once a pollutant was listed as a HAP, EPA was required
to propose emissions standards, and do so quickly. Furthermore, EPA had to
provide an “ample margin of safety” to protect the “public health,” without any
consideration of cost or feasibility.110 For many candidate HAPs, that “ample
margin of safety” would require an unrealistic zero emissions.111 In other words,
105. EPA’s Air Pollution Control Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 17 (1983) [hereinafter November
1983 Hearings] (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA).
106. See discussion supra Section II.C.1, at pp. 34–35.
107. See November 1983 Hearings, supra note 105, at 144–46 (Nov. 3, 1983 Memorandum).
108. See COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-199, DELAYS IN
EPA’S REGULATIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS (1983), http://www.gao.gov/assets/1
50/140586.pdf.
109. Id. at 21–23, 28–35, 43–44.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) (containing no mention of cost or feasibility).
111. See Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 Fed. Reg.
21,402 (May 25, 1976) (“Evidence has accumulated that indicates that the no-threshold concept can also
be applicable to chemical carcinogens.”); see also Graham, supra note 66, at 130–31.
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once EPA listed a HAP, it was forced to create a rapid and potentially cost
prohibitive regulatory scheme, with little flexibility to avoid potentially
economically catastrophic consequences. Several commentators during that time
period argued that it was this reason, rather than partisan affiliation or
environmental ideology, that led to inaction.112 Reducing EGU-sourced mercury in
particular would also have been difficult during this time because stringent mercury
reduction technologies were unavailable. While anti-regulation forces during this
time period failed to substantially weaken CAA due to strong congressional and
public resistance, the wide discretion the executive branch enjoyed in rulemaking
and enforcement actions allowed EPA to delay regulations, and minimize the
impact on industry of those that did get through.
C.

The CAA Amendments of 1990 and their Aftermath: 1990-2000
1.

Development of the 1990 Amendments

By the end of the 1980s, and despite EPA’s earlier promises to Congress,
EPA had still only listed eight HAPs under Section 112.113 In 1988, Congress was
faced with a president who had indicated a greater willingness to accept
environmental regulations.114 Distrustful of EPA in light of its actions during the
Reagan administration, the more pro-environmentally-minded members of
Congress began work on what would become the 1990 Clean Air Act
112. E.g., Graham, supra note 66, at 116 (“The EPA’s failure to implement section 112 . . . is not
simply a reflection of sinister political forces . . . . The persistence of implementation problems
throughout the section’s history suggests that there may be fundamental statutory and administrative
obstacles—in addition to technological and economic barriers—to expeditious control of airborne
carcinogens.”); Cross, supra note 61, at 220 (“[G]iven the current state of scientific knowledge, there is
no demonstrably safe level of human exposure to a carcinogen . . . such a total prohibition makes the
agency avoid regulation.”); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1983: Hearing on S. 768 Before S. Comm. on
Env’t and Pub. Works, 98th Cong. 9 (1984) (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA) ( “The simple fact is, an automatic listing requirement might make us
make decisions or might require us to make decisions that are not always in the best interest of the
country.”); Clean Air Act Amendments (Part 3): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 475 (1989) (statement of Rick Abraham)
(former EPA official characterized section 112 as an “example of the perfect being the enemy of the
good . . . because of the burdens put on the Agency in trying to do something that isn’t doable, the
process got paralyzed”).
113. See Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L.
1721, 1774 (1991) (“EPA proved unwilling or unable to mount an effective regulatory program in its
twenty-year effort to implement section 112.”); November 1983 Hearings, supra note 105, at 2 (“At this
moment more than 25 substances are candidates for [HAP] listing at the EPA. Unfortunately, they have
been candidates not for weeks or months, but for years. That is a sorry record.”); Clean Air Act
Amendments (Part 3): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, supra note 112, at 295 (testimony of David D. Doniger, Senior Att’y, Natural
Resources Defense Council) (“In nearly 19 years since the Clean Air Act of 1970 was enacted, EPA has
done extraordinarily little to protect the American people and their environment from toxic air
pollutants.”).
114. See Susan Page, Bush Bucks Reagan Over Environment, NEWSDAY, 17 May 1988, at 15
(discussing then Vice President George Bush’s call for greater environmental protections); Hugh
McIntosh, Catching Up on the Clean Air Act, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 226, 228 (1993). Nixon had
actually considered but rejected George H. W. Bush as the first EPA Administrator, believing his ties to
the Texas oil industry would be a political liability. LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 76.
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Amendments, which incorporated some of the elements of the earlier HAP-related
bills but went much further.115
While earlier unsuccessful congressional bills had attempted to force EPA
to take action on a number of potential HAPs, the 1990 Amendments went much
further, listing 189 pollutants as HAPs and requiring EPA to either remove those
pollutants from the list—if it could determine there was adequate data that showed
no adverse health or environmental effects—or set emissions standards for each
over a ten year period for “major sources” of those pollutants.116 The Amendments
defined “major sources” to be those that release 10 tpy of any HAP or 25 tpy or
more of any combination of HAPs.117
As an apparent concession to critics’ charge that the Section 112
rulemaking process could result in burdensome results with little flexibility, taking
into account logistical and economic complications, the 1990 Amendments also
fundamentally changed how HAP emissions standards were to be set. Dropping an
absolute requirement that EPA set those standards that “provide[] an ample margin
of safety to protect the public health,”118 the 1990 Amendments instead allowed
emissions standards for both new and existing sources that reflected “the maximum
degree of reduction in [HAP] emissions . . . taking into consideration the cost of
achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and
environmental impacts and energy requirements. . . . “119 The standards developed
to implement this “maximum degree of reduction” for HAPs was characterized as
the Maximum Achievable Control Technology, or MACT standards. For new
sources, the minimum standard, or MACT floor, could not be less stringent than the
“best controlled similar source.”120 For existing sources, however, the MACT floor
could be set at a less stringent standard – “the average emission limitation by the
best performing 12% of the existing sources . . . . “121

115. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). For a detailed
account of the legislative history of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments by one of its architects, see
Waxman, supra note 113.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)–(3), (e)(1) (2012). A subsequent Congressional joint resolution
removed hydrogen sulfide from the list. Act of Dec. 4, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-187, 105 Stat. 1285
(1991). Since the 1990 CAA Amendments were passed, EPA has only successfully removed three HAPs
through the section 112(b)(3)(A) delisting process. Those HAPs are caprolactam, 40 C.F.R. § 63.60
(2016), methyl ethyl ketone, id. § 63.61, and ethylene glycol monobutyl ether, id. § 60.63.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).
118. Id. § 7412(b)(9).
119. Id. § 7412(d)(2).
120. Id. § 7412(d)(3). As with the NSPS provisions of section 111, a “new source” refers to a
stationary source constructed or modified after emissions standards have been promulgated. Id. §
7412(a)(4).
121. Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A). As will be discussed later, EPA has a significant amount of leeway in
deciding what makes up that 12% of best performing existing standards. The 1990 Amendments also
require the administrator to review residual risks not addressed by MACT standards within 8 years of
emissions standards promulgation, and if need be, institute more stringent controls. Id. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
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EGU-Specific HAP Provisions of the 1990 Amendments

The new HAP provisions applied to all major sources except EGUs, where
Congress implemented a “unique procedure.”122 The original Senate version of the
bill sent to conference gave EPA five years after enactment to regulate mercury and
particulate HAPs from sources that accounted for at least 90% of the aggregate
emissions – which would by necessity include EGUs for mercury as well as other
HAPs.123 Even given a five year deadline, the proposed standards deadline for
EGU-sourced mercury particularly faced significant resistance from industry and
its allies in Congress, nominally due to both scientific and technical uncertainties
though the increased costs of mercury controls was almost certainly the primary
concern. Furthermore, members of Congress believed that separate acid rain
provisions in the bill would also control EGU-sourced HAPs sufficiently to obviate
the need for separate HAP standards.124
During conference, therefore, language was added to the Section 112
amendments exempting EGUs from the same regulation schedule as other major
sources of the 189 pollutants.125 Instead, the 1990 Amendments required EPA to
first carry out a study (“Utility Study”) to evaluate the risks from EGU-sourced
HAPs, particularly mercury, before deciding whether it was “necessary and
appropriate” to regulate EGUs under Section 112.126 Additionally, Section 112(n)
required two other reports to follow: (1) a National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences (NIEHS) report on the level at which mercury becomes dangerous,
also due within three years; and (2) an EPA study of EGU-sourced mercury and its
potential health impacts, due within four years; EPA study would come to play an
outsized role in subsequent debates.127 Once the Utility Study was issued, EPA was

122. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015).
123. S. 1630, 101st Cong. § 112(c)(6), (e)(5)(D) (1990) (as engrossed in Senate).
124. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Congress modified that regulatory
scheme for power plants . . . because the 1990 amendments established a separate program to control . . .
emissions contributing to acid rain, and many thought that just by complying with those requirements,
plants might reduce their emissions of [HAPs] to acceptable levels.”). The costs of additional
requirements on coal-fired power plants to address mercury pollution beyond what would be required
for acid rain control was certainly a cause of concern. See, e.g., ENVTL. & NAT. RES. POLICY DIV.,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at
779 (1998) (Oct. 27, 1990 statement by Sen. Burdick, Chair of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee during conference debate: “a full control program . . . to control mercury emissions
from coal-fired power plants would double the cost of acid rain control with no expectation of
perceptible improvement in public health. . . . “).
125. EGUs would otherwise automatically qualify as “major sources” due to the fact that they
release—or have the potential to release—well in excess of the 25 tpy limits of section 112(a)(1), most
of that in the form of hydrogen chloride. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY
OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS -FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-18 to 3-19 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 UTILITY STUDY], https://www3.epa.
gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/eurtc1.pdf (showing HAP emissions from a characteristic coal- and oil-fired
EGUs).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
127. Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A)–(C) . EPA was also tasked with a fourth study to be conducted in
cooperation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) examining the
contribution of atmospheric HAPs generally to pollution loading in the Great Lakes and coastal waters.
Id. § 7412(m).
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required to rely on it to determine whether it was “appropriate and necessary” to
regulate EGU-sourced HAPs.128
In 1992, during the time in which the statutorily required studies were in
process, President Clinton had assumed office. Though a Democrat, his
administration disappointed many environmentalists who felt he was too willing to
compromise with regulated industries. Indeed, through most of his tenure EPA
mercury and HAP reports went unreleased.129
3.

EPA and NRC Mercury Reports: Conclusions and Controversies

The NIEHS finished its study by 1995,130 but EPA’s reports were delayed
well past their deadlines, drawing congressional pressure. In May 1997, Sen.
Patrick Leahy introduced a resolution on the Senate floor urging EPA to release the
mercury report to Congress as required by the 1990 Amendments, though it later
died in committee.131 However, pressure on EPA appeared to work and in
December 1997, four years after the statutory deadline, EPA transmitted to
Congress its CAA §112(n)(1)(B)-mandated report to Congress (“EPA Mercury
Report”). That was followed up shortly after by the Utility Study in February of
1998.132
The 1998 Utility Study identified 67 of the 188 HAPs designated by
Congress in the 1990 Amendments as potentially emitted by EGUs.133 Of those 67
HAPs, 14 were identified as “priority” HAPs due to their health impacts, including
mercury.134 While reportedly close to releasing the report that focused on EGUsourced mercury and its health impacts in early 1995, that report languished at EPA
128. While the 1990 Amendments did not state the purpose of the NIEHS and EPA studies, the
engrossed Senate bill had originally intended them to be filed on EPA rulemaking docket and used when
setting post-listing emissions standards. S. 1630 § 112(e)(5).
129. See BENJAMIN KLINE, FIRST ALONG THE RIVER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 126 (4th ed. 2011); GREEN TALK IN THE WHITE HOUSE 162–64 (Tarla
Rai Peterson ed., 2004).
130. NIEHS STUDY, EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-3053 (1995). By the time the other reports were released,
the NIEHS study had become somewhat dated and does not appear to play a significant role in the post1999 EGU-sourced mercury debate; its results were effectively assimilated into or superseded by the
later EPA and NAS reports. See 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9370 (“The NIEHS completed the
NIEHS Study in 1995 . . . Because NAS completed its study 5 years after the NIEHS Study, and
considered additional information not earlier available to NIEHS, for purposes of this document we
discuss the content of the NAS Study as opposed to the NIEHS Study.”). Indeed, the actual date of the
NIEHS Study report is cited inconsistently—the 1997 MERCURY REPORT and the 1998 HAP Report
both give the NIEHS Report an earlier 1993 publication date. 1997 MERCURY REPORT, Vol. VII, at 913. It is possible that there was a preliminary 1993 report created before the study as a whole ended, and
which is cited in those works. I was unable to obtain a report based on the study; the docket number
listed was identified in the regulations, but no document with that identification number listed in is
available from the Federal government’s centralized rulemaking website, http://regulations.gov or
EPA’s archived reports at the National Service Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP). I sent a
request to NIEHS for this report but received no response.
131. S. Con. Res. 28, 105th Cong. (1997) (“A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of
Congress that the Administrator of the [EPA] should take immediate steps to abate emissions of
mercury and release to Congress the study of mercury required under the Clean Air Act . . . . “).
132. See 1998 UTILITY STUDY, supra note 125.
133. Id. at ES-4.
134. Id. at ES-6.
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in draft form until 1998, most likely due to pressure from not only the utility
industry, but also from representatives of the seafood industry who were worried
about public perception of mercury risks from fish.135
What the 1997 EPA Mercury Report lacked in timeliness it made up for in
scale; it consisted of eight volumes and included in-depth analyses of
anthropogenic sourcing, fate and transport, human health and environmental
exposure, and potential mercury control technologies with their attendant costs.136
Reviewing the scientific literature, the report concluded that there was “a plausible
link between mercury emissions from anthropogenic combustion and industrial
sources and mercury concentrations in air, soil, water and sediments . . . and
methylmercury concentrations in freshwater fish.”137 The 1997 EPA Mercury
Report also concluded that EGUs had surpassed municipal waste combustors and
medical waste incinerators as the largest “identifiable” anthropogenic sources of
mercury emissions to the atmosphere; it estimated EGU mercury emissions at
approximately 52 tons in 1994-1995, accounting for 33% of total anthropogenic
emissions.138
Both proponents and opponents of EGU mercury regulations drew on the
Report, with the former arguing it showed action was needed to protect the
vulnerable populations identified, and the latter claiming it showed that for most
Americans methylmercury in fish was not a significant threat.139 In regards to the
vulnerable populations identified in the Report, debates focused on both the limited
and contradictory epidemiological data available, and the relative importance of
EGU-sourced mercury as a contributor to methylmercury in fish.140 Faced with the
potential for imminent and costly mercury control standards, members of Congress
successfully pushed to have the Report’s health assumptions scrutinized by the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), a tactic that had become a frequent means to

135. See Dieter Bradbury, Congressional Delegation Slow to Respond to Mercury Threat Sen.
Olympia Snowe Initially Urged the EPA to Withhold a Controversial Report That Could Result in
Stricter Pollution Limits, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD: THE MERCURY MENACE, Sept. 29, 1997, at A7
(discussing the reasons why EPA withheld the report).
136. See id. (mentioning EPA report suggested solutions for cutting mercury in the environment).
137. 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. I, at 3-20.
138. See 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 29, Vol. II, at ES-4, ES-10, 4-2 tbl.4-2.
139. James Gerstenzang, EPA Report Raises new Concerns About Mercury; Environment: Study
Sees Greater Risk of Toxic Substance Entering the Atmosphere, Food Chain, L.A. TIMES, DEC. 19,
1997, at 37 (claiming that mercury from EGUs is a greater hazard than previously believed); Jim
Nichols, EPA Calls for Mercury Watch Utilities, Miners Fear for Future of Coal-Fired Plants, PLAIN
DEALER, June 15, 1998, at 1B (stating that EPA’s position against mercury from coal-fired EGUs is
shaky as EPA’s assumptions about the health risks of mercury “are based on extrapolation, not direct
testing”).
140. E.g, Regional Haze and Mercury Pollution: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air,
Wetlands, Private Property &Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t &Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 30–
32, 38 (1998) (statement of Gary Myers, Professor of Neurology and Pediatrics, Rochester, New York) (
“The results of the Seychelles child development study so far . . . indicate no adverse developmental
effects from prenatal methylmercury exposure in the range commonly achieved by consuming large
amounts of fish.”); id. at 36 (statement of Leonard Levin, Program Manager, Air Toxics Health and Risk
Assessment, Electric Power Research Institute) (“[Seychelles] findings, if they’re supported in later
analyses, imply that a given mercury level in fish may be less of a threat to human health than formerly
believed.”).
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both delay environmental decisions as well as subject agency decisions to what
some members of Congress perceived as a more scientifically conservative
standard of review.141 The targets were the assumptions used by EPA as to what
level of mercury level in fish constituted a health risk.142
Congress therefore required EPA to contract with NAS to “perform a
comprehensive review of mercury health research and prepare recommendations on
the appropriate level for a mercury exposure reference dose [RfD].”143 If the NAS
referral had been a tactic to forestall or thwart mercury regulation, however, it was
not particularly successful. In July 2000, the NAS’s National Research Council
(NRC) released a report that drew on more recent data from the Seychelles, Faroe,
and New Zealand studies, examined the existing body of toxicological and
physiological information, and concluded EPA’s RfD was appropriate.144 The 2000
NRC Report stated that based on the RfD, “over 60,000 newborns annually might
be at risk for adverse neurodevelopmental effects from in utero exposure to
[methylmercury].”145 The results were stark; NRC concluded that mercury in fish
“is likely to be sufficient to result in an increase in the number of children who
have to struggle to keep up in school and who might require remedial classes or

141. JASANOFF, supra note 16, at 59 (“Risk-assessment guidelines . . . were generally characterized
[by industry representatives] as science, suitable for resolution by accredited expert bodies like the
National Academy of Sciences. Industrial groups were convinced that these technocratic organizations
would reach conclusions that were scientifically more conservative. . . . “); Heinzerling & Steinzor Part
I, supra note 10, at 10301 (“In the last few years, referral of regulatory controversies to NAS peer
review panels has gone from being a useful tool in complex regulator decisionmaking to becoming a
central tactic used to forestall or delay regulation of toxics.”); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 17, at
64 (“Most historians of science would say that the Academy has an intrinsic conservatism stemming
from its dependence on the executive branch . . . Moreover, Academy reports are normally consensus
reports . . . [t]he result is often a ‘least common denominator’ conclusion, with a text innocuous enough
that everyone involved can agree.”).
142. In examining the potential health impacts of the organomercury forms accumulating in fish, the
1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT used an RfD, or “[a]n estimate . . . of a daily exposure to the human
population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious
effects during a lifetime,” of .1 µg/kg/day, or one ten millionth of a gram per day. 1997 EPA MERCURY
REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. I, at 0-2, 3-27 (RfD based on studies of Iraqi grain poisoning victims).
RfDs are determined through an oftentimes-complicated process: after a toxic hazard is identified,
“dose-response” assessments using epidemiological and/or animal experiments identify the highest level
of exposure for which no observed adverse effect is seen. This dose is then multiplied by an “uncertainty
factor” to account for scientific uncertainty (and occasionally a “modifying factor” derived through the
evaluators’ professional judgment) in order to create the RfD, which can then start as the base from
which to evaluate the health impacts of the toxic chemical on human populations. The less data
available, the higher the uncertainty factor is set and therefore the lower the RfD. Somewhat
paradoxically, even where additional research shows a substance is more toxic than originally believed,
the RfD might go down because there is less need of uncertainty levels. See generally Michael L.
Dourson et al., Uncertainties in the Reference Dose for Methylmercury, 22 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 677
(2001).
143. H.R. REP. NO. 105-276, at 282 (1998).
144. See 2000 NRC REPORT, supra note 32, at 326–27. The NRC dose-response assessment resulted
in a benchmark dose level of 12 ppm, as compared to EPA’s 11 ppm.
145. Id. at 325.
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special education . . . . [T]he long-term goal needs to be a reduction in the
concentrations of [methylmercury] in fish . . . . 146
4.

The 2000 Listing Rule: EPA Finally Regulates EGU-Sourced
Mercury

On December 20, 2000, faced with an incoming administration that was
likely to be far less friendly to pollution control regulations, and armed with strong
scientific support from the new NRC report, the promulgated the 2000 Listing
Rule, holding that it was “appropriate and necessary” that EGUs be regulated under
CAA Section 112(c).147 Citing the 1998 Utility Study, the Rule discussed multiple
HAPs of concern being emitted from EGUs, but relied principally on EGU-sourced
mercury to justify its determination, noting “there is a plausible link between
methylmercury concentrations in fish and mercury emissions from [EGUs].”148 The
2000 listing rule did not impose specific regulatory requirements, stating that EPA
would later subcategorize EGU source categories and set emissions “floors” for
those categories for mercury and the other HAPs.149
5.

Mercury Emissions Regulations in the 1990’s: Context and
Conclusions

While the 1990 Amendments dramatically reshaped air toxics regulations
under CAA, EGU-sourced mercury and other HAPs escaped mandatory regulation
pending further investigation. In 1992, a Democratic administration came to power,
which many expected to be somewhat more amenable to regulation and more
focused on the benefits of environmental regulations rather than simply the costs.
However, President Clinton still employed a more pro-business, anti-regulatorycost rhetoric than many Democrats preferred, and in 1994, a conservative
Republican majority captured both houses of Congress, and made removing or
weakening environmental protection laws and regulations one of their primary
goals through both substantive statutory changes as well as significantly reducing
EPA’s budget for enforcement of environmental laws, particularly of CAA and the
Clean Water Act.150 These political fights may have resulted in a level of caution at
EPA that delayed release of the reports until late in President Clinton’s second
146. Id. at 9. So stark was the conclusion that even the power industry appeared to accept the panel’s
conclusions, “shifting the debate over mercury regulation from if to how.” Andrew C. Revkin, Milestone
Report on Mercury Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/12/us/m
ilestone-report-on-mercury-emissions.html.
147. 2000 Listing Rule, supra note 4, at 79,826. EPA would later note that the HAP reductions
expected from acid rain controls set forth in the 1990 Amendments—the putative reason why EGUsourced contaminants were not designated HAPs at the time—had turned out lower than expected. See
Proposed Supplemental Finding That it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate HAPs From Coal- and
Oil-Fired EGUs, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,025, 75,036–37 (Dec. 1, 2015).
148. 2000 Listing Rule, supra note 4, at 79,830.
149. Id. An industry group quickly appealed the 2000 listing decision to the D.C. Circuit, but the
case was dismissed on the grounds that HAP listings under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4) are not subject to
review until emissions standards are set. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001 WL
936363, (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001) (per curiam).
150. See LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 125–40.
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term, possibly aided by industry pressure, as might the agency’s realization that at
the time it would be difficult to institute stringent mercury pollution controls.151
Throughout the 1990s, the number of fish consumption advisories based on
mercury levels increased, though for most of the decade regulations under CAA
remained in stasis pending the outcome of the various statutorily-required reports
on mercury and HAP. The 2000 Listing Rule, however, would lead to a far more
active debate in the 2000s and beyond.
D.

Regulatory Battles and Atmospheric Ideologies: 2001-Present
1.

The Anti-Regulatory Redux: George W. Bush’s Pollution Policy

Under CAA Section 112(c)(5), the 2000 Listing Rule required emissions
standards for EGU-sourced mercury and other HAP be promulgated within two
years. Shortly after the 2000 Listing Decision, however, George W. Bush was
inaugurated. A former oil company executive (like his Vice-President, Dick
Cheney), who ran on an explicitly anti-regulatory platform, his time in office saw
attempted rollbacks of the fairly modest regulations issued by the Clinton-era EPA
and significant efforts to substantially relax federal pollution control laws,
particularly the CAA.152 The Bush administration had promised in its 2002 budget
to “reform the current single-pollutant approach to regulating existing electric
utility plants with a multi-pollutant approach, which would provide regulatory
certainty to utilities, phase in reductions over a reasonable period, and make use of
market-based incentives to further clean up the environment.”153 EPA justified
multi-pollutant approaches on the grounds that many pollutants had common
emissions sources, control technologies, and interacted with each other in a way
that impacted exposure pathways and risks.154 A multi-pollutant approach was not a
new one; that policy approach grew out of converging trends of technological
advancements in emissions controls in the 1990s that could eliminate multiple
contaminants, as well as growing scientific awareness that air pollutants interacted
with each other in the atmosphere and human bodies in ways different than when
by themselves.155 While environmentalists initially considered President Bush’s
ascension to the presidency a potential environmental catastrophe in light of his
anti-regulatory rhetoric, oil industry experience, and his pro-industry record as

151. See 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at 6-2 (“Given the relative low
maturity level of these technologies being tested, commercial deployment is still several years away.”).
152. See EMILY COUSINS ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, REWRITING THE RULES: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S FIRST-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL RECORD (Special ed. 2005), https://www.nrdc.org/
sites/default/files/rr2005.pdf.
153. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET
FOR AMERICA’S PRIORITIES, 73–74
(2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2002BLUEPRINT/pdf/BUDGET-2002-BLUEPRINT.pdf.
154. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE MULTI-POLLUTANT REPORT: TECHNICAL CONCEPTS AND
EXAMPLES 1-1 to 1-2 (2008), https://archive.epa.gov/airquality/aqmp/web/pdf/20080702_multipoll.pdf.
155. See generally Suzanne Shelley & Charles B. Sedman, Controlling Emissions from Fuel and
Waste Combustion: Newer Methods Look to Remove Multiple Contaminants, 106 CHEMICAL
ENGINEERING 82 (1999).
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Governor of Texas,156 they did support a multi-pollutant approach in theory,
particularly in light of EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman’s public
acknowledgment that global warming was occurring and suggestion that carbon
dioxide regulation would be included as a co-regulated pollutant.157
a.

The Clear Skies Plan and Mercury

In February 2002, Bush released more details about his “multi-pollutant”
approach with his “Clear Skies Initiative,” an approach to EGU emissions which
sought to replace traditional emissions standards approaches with a multiplepollutant, cap-and-trade plan similar to the one that had been created to control acid
rain in the early 1990s. As originally announced, the Initiative promised to reduce
sulfur dioxide emissions by 73%, nitrogen oxide emissions by 67%, and mercury
emissions by 69% by 2018.158 Environmental groups criticized the Initiative,159
believing the bill did not go nearly far enough in reducing EGU emissions of SO2
and NOX, and would be far less stringent than the 90% reduction in mercury
emissions EPA had predicted under the post-2000 MACT standards. Introduced as
identical bills in both the House and the Senate in July 2002, and reintroduced in
substantively identical form in 2003 and 2005,160 the Clear Skies Act was the
cornerstone of the Bush administration’s air pollution policy.
The Clear Skies Plan and its proposed implementing legislation caused a
massive backlash from the environmental community, and were fiercely opposed
by Democratic members of Congress from the beginning, never making it out of
committee.161 Though Republicans attempted to keep different versions of the
Clear Skies Act alive over the next few years, after March 2005, it was effectively
dead as a legislative proposal.162 During the fight over the Clear Skies Plan,
Democrats introduced competing multi-pollutant bills that would have led to more
significant reductions in mercury emissions, though none were successful either.163
156. See Jim Yardley, On the Record: Governor Bush and the Environment; Bush Approach to
Pollution: Preference for Self-Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1999), http://www.nytimes.co
m/1999/11/09/us/record-governor-bush-environment-bush-approach-pollution-preference-for-self.html.
157. Eric Pianin, EPA Mulls Limits for Power Plant Emissions; Environmentalists Laud White
House Effort on Pollution, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at A13. Shortly after, Whitman would be
informed by President Bush that he had changed his mind, and that he had made a mistake calling CO2 a
pollutant. John J. Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, How the President Changed His Mind on Carbon
Dioxide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at A20.
158. Press Release, President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 14, 2002, 2:05 PM), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02
/20020214-5.html.

159. See LAYZER, supra note 16, at 284.
160. Clear Skies Act of 2002, H.R. 5266, 107th Cong. (2002); Clear Skies Act of 2002, S. 2815,
107th Cong. (2002); Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 108th Cong. (2003); Clear Skies Act of 2003,
S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003).
161. See Rugh, supra note 10.
162. See Mary Curtius & Tom Hamburger, Bush’s Clear Skies Act Stalls in the Senate, L.A. TIMES
(March 10, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/10/nation/na-skies10.
163. In the Senate, Vermont’s James Jeffords introduced the Clean Power Act, which sought to
reduce EGU-sourced emissions of SO2, NOX, CO2, and mercury through a new CAA provision. Clean
Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. (2001); Clean Power Act of 2003, S. 366, 108th Cong. (2003).
His colleague Sen. Carper would later introduce the Clean Air Planning Act, which offered a more

Winter 2018

b.

ALCHEMICAL RULEMAKING

155

A Change in Strategy: Instituting a Cap-and-Trade Plan Through the
Rulemaking Process164

Through 2004, even while President Bush was trying to convince
Congress to accept his Clear Skies alternative, EPA still appeared to be moving (if
slowly and begrudgingly) towards finally releasing MACT standards under Section
112.165 The agency had convened a working group which met fourteen times
between March 2001 and March 2003 to discuss the proposed Section 112 rule,166
and the members of the group were charged specifically to determine an
appropriate MACT standard for mercury.167 In December 2001, EPA had informed
an industry group that the MACT standards under development could reduce EGU
mercury emissions by 90% by 2008.168
However, behind the scenes, Bush EPA appointees appeared to have been
secretly working on a different objective.169 While the MACT group was meeting
to develop the MACT standards, political appointees at EPA’s Office of Air and
Radiation quietly worked to implement a version of the Clear Skies Act’s failed
cap-and-trade scheme for mercury through EPA rulemaking. On April 1, 2003, a
planned fifteenth meeting for the MACT group was cancelled and never
rescheduled,170 though the head of EPA’s Air and Radiation Office assured

stringent cap-and-trade program for mercury as well as SO2, NOX, and CO2. Clean Air Planning Act of
2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003); Clean Air Planning Act of 2007, S. 1177, 110th Cong. (2007). The
Energy Information Agency conducted a comparative analysis of the three competing plans, finding
reductions in all pollutants, particularly mercury, were highest under the Clean Power Plan and lowest
under the Clear Skies Plan. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2004-05,
ANALYSIS OF S. 1844, THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003; S. 843, THE CLEAN AIR PLANNING ACT OF 2003;
AND S. 366, THE CLEAN POWER ACT OF 2003 (2004).
164. For a comprehensive account of the circumstances that led up to the 2004 Proposed Rule, see
Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I, supra note 10.
165. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II, supra note 10, at 10488.
166. Proposed Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs; and in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: EGUs, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4656 (Jan. 30, 2004)
(to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 60, 63)) [hereinafter 2004 Proposed Clean Air Mercury Rule, or 2004
Proposed CAMR].
167. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I, supra note 10, at 10306.
168. CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE & NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION: MORE MERCURY POLLUTION, HIGHER HEALTH RISKS, at *2,
http://www.savethecleanairact.org/pdf/FS-S-131-Mercury.pdf.
169. The following year, the Natural Resources Defense Council would show that at an April 2001
meeting the Edison Electric Institute, an influential industry group, a lobbyist assured energy sector
representatives that the Bush administration would use EPA rulemaking to institute both criteria and
hazardous pollutant restrictions that “won’t be . . . robust” with the “goal here . . . to gain a foothold, an
irreversible foothold on the next generation of reasonable cost effective SO2 and NOX reduction, plus air
toxics that we can all live with and that someone else can’t undo.” The Clear Skies Act of 2005: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 254-57 (2005) (transcript of speech by
Quinn Shea, Senior Director for Environmental Activities, Edison Electric Institute).
170. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II, supra note 10, at 10489; Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller,
Mercury Emissions Rule Geared to Benefit Industry, Staffers Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2004),
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/16/nation/na-mercury16/3; Eric Pianin, EPA Led Mercury Policy
Shift; Agency Scuttled Task Force That Advised Tough Approach, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at A17.
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suspicious members of Congress that while EPA advocated passage of the Clear
Skies Act, it still would provide a MACT standard.171
When EPA finally released its 2004 proposed “Clean Air Mercury Rule”
(CAMR) to regulate EGU-sourced HAP, it did propose Section 112 MACT
restrictions that EPA forecast would reduce mercury emissions by thirty-four tons
in 2010 and thirty-one tons in 2020–standards far weaker than what the working
group had anticipated.172 Because no existing EGUs had installed mercury-specific
emissions reduction equipment, EPA had significant freedom in determining the
MACT floors for both new and existing sources, and took advantage of it by
subcategorizing EGUs by coal type, then using a combination of emissions tests,
mercury composition of the coal used, and a statistical corrective that assumed each
plant was emitting mercury at its peak level.173 The proposed standards for new
sources were based on the statutorily required “best-controlled similar source”
which EPA determined were PM and flue gas control measures, with emissions
standards calculated through a similar process as determined the MACT floor for
existing units.174
As surprising as the extremely weak MACT standards were to observers
(including the MACT working group), even more surprising were the non-MACTbased cap-and-trade alternatives that EPA proposed. The first proposed cap-andtrade rule was based on a provision in Section 112(n)(1)(A) that required EPA to
report “alternative control strategies for emissions” in the 1998 Utility Study. EPA
had followed this requirement in the report, describing in detail a number of
alternate control strategies, including technological controls like coal cleaning and
gasification, as well as energy conservation and management practices, but did not
include cap-and-trade as a control strategy for mercury.175 In the 2004 proposed
CAMR, EPA argued that this reporting obligation also gave it the authority to

171. The Clear Skies Initiative: A Multipollutant Approach to the Clean Air Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 95
(2003). When asked about whether MACT mercury modeling had been done, the head of EPA’s Office
of Air and Radiation hedged, stating “[w]e are doing all the analysis we need to do.”
172. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4706. The proposed rule only applied to EGUs of
more than 25 megawatts generating capacity that provided electricity for sale. Id. at 4727. In addition to
mercury, the Proposed CAMR also proposed regulating nickel emissions from oil-fired utilities, but
none of the other HAPs discussed in the 2000 Listing Decision. Id. at 4689.
173. Id. at 4668–82. For a detailed critique of the means by which EPA calculated the MACT floor,
see MICHAEL AUCOTT & LEO KORN, N.J. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., EPA’S PROPOSED MACT FLOOR
STANDARDS FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED UTILITY UNITS (2004), http://www.nj.gov
/dep/dsr/mercury/mact.pdf. Henry Waxman, one of the primary architects of the 1990 Amendments, had
been concerned about the possible abuse of determining MACT standards by categories shortly after
passage. See Waxman, supra note 112, at 1777. While Rep. Waxman notes that in §112(c)(1) Congress
mandated that any such categories “be consistent with the list of source categories established pursuant
to section [111], [the New Source], and part C, [prevention of significant deterioration provisions],” the
actual language of the provision only requires EPA do this to “the extent practicable,” and explicitly
states that “nothing in [the sentence cited by Rep. Waxman] limits the Administrator’s authority to
establish subcategories under this section, as appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (2012).
174. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4677–93.
175. See 1998 UTILITY STUDY, supra note 125, 13-1 to 13-47(“Alternative Control Strategies for
Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions Reductions”).
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implement one of the alternative control strategies, apparently including one that it
never reported on in the Utility Study.176
The proposed rule also offered a parallel cap-and-trade plan under Section
111(a)(1), a provision that, while not explicitly allowing such a program, does not
explicitly foreclose on one.177 However, before implementing such a cap-and-trade
plan under Section 111, EPA would have to somehow delist mercury as a HAP,
since pollutants cannot be regulated under both Section 111 and Section 112. Both
the Section 111(d) and Section 112(n)(1)(A) cap-and-trade alternatives would cap
mercury emissions at an undisclosed amount in 2010 determined by the co-benefits
of SO2 and NOX reductions projected from another proposed rule published that
day, the proposed Clean Air Interstate Rule.178 The caps were based on the
proposed Section 112 MACT floors, but the cap-and-trade system would allow not
only banking of unused allowances, but provided a “safety valve” provision that
capped allowance costs at $2,187.50 per ounce, making it potentially less
expensive for some EGUs to simply buy allowances instead of even attempting to
limit emissions.179 EPA followed the 2004 Proposed CAMR with a Notice of Data
Availability (NODA), proposing a process for quantifying the mercury deposition
and bioaccumulation impact of the proposed rule.
c.

The Backlash Against the Proposed CAMR

While environmentalists have frequently invoked the accusation that
industry is often allowed to write the regulations, for the 2004 Proposed CAMR
this was not hyperbole; the proposed rule contained numerous legal arguments that
mirrored almost exactly memoranda submitted by attorney lobbyists from the law
firm at which both the head of EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation and his principle
deputy had worked before joining EPA—who argued for a cap-and-trade system.180

176. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4661–62 (“Because Congress directed EPA to
develop control strategies that would be alternatives to the usual section 112(d) MACT standard, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress authorized EPA to implement such alternatives.”).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (“The term ‘standard of performance’ means . . . the application of
the best system of emission reduction . . . (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements). . . . “).
178. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4698; Proposed Interstate Air Quality Rule (IAQR),
69 Fed. Reg. 4566 (Jan. 30, 2004). Unusually, the Proposed IAQR, a cap-and-trade plan for SO2, NOX,
and ozone, had been accepted by both industry and environmental groups; however, it would be
overturned in 2008 after a small group of utility companies challenged some of its provisions. North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
179. 2004 Proposed CAMR., supra note 166, at 4704. While EPA control costs vary depending on
factors such as coal and boiler type, costs for activated carbon injection, generally the most effective
mercury control technology, could reach $50,000 per pound, or $3,125.00 an ounce. NE. STATES FOR
COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT OF MERCURY
EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvi (2010), http://www.
4cleanair.org/Documents/July2010NESCAUMFinalReptHgControlandMeasurementTechsatUSPPs.pdf.
179
See Proposed Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources, EGUs: Notice of Data Availability, 69 Fed. Reg.
69,864–78 (Dec. 1, 2004).
180. Eric Pianin, Proposed Mercury Rules Bear Industry Mark, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2004), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/31/proposed-mercury-rules-bear-industrymark/028e1379-0026-4bcb-b7ce-192bbae7b4c6/?utm_term=.686a49ccc080
(“A side-by-side
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The cap-and-trade plan and the circumstances surrounding its development evoked
quick opposition from internal EPA staff, environmental groups, many states,
scientific experts on the mercury issue, and members of Congress.181 MACT
working group members and EPA staff reported that technical experts at the agency
were cut out of the process.182 Members of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee were suspicious of the process resulting in the 2004 Proposed
CAMR, and requested analyses of the proposed rule from EPA’s Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), and from the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
both of which released reports highly critical of the Proposed CAMR and the
process by which it was created.183
EPA OIG conducted an internal investigation and concluded that the
proposed Section 112 MACT standards had been arrived at through a pretextual
calculation; rather than determine the best controlled 12% of existing sources
required by Section 112(d)(3), EPA senior management had simply instructed staff
to take as a given that a MACT-based standard was to result in 2010 emissions of
thirty-four tons, and then develop a MACT methodology that would result in that
number.184 They did this through modifying various assumptions, and modifying
variables and re-running models until the latter projected the thirty-four ton
number.185
comparison of one of the three proposed rules and the memorandums prepared by Latham &
Watkins . . . shows that at least a dozen paragraphs were lifted, sometimes verbatim, from the industry
suggestions.”); Juliet Eilperin, EPA Wording Found to Mirror Industry’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39749-2004Sep21.html;
Matt
Fleischer-Black,
Mercury Man; Did the EPA’s Jeffrey Holmstead Take a Cue from Latham Lobbyists?, AM. LAW. (Aug.
1, 2005), https://www.iatp.org/news/mercury-man-did-the-epas-jeffrey-holmstead-take-a-cue-fromlatham-lobbyists. Holmstead would later claim that he had been given the language from another agency
with its origins unmarked. Fleischer-Black, supra. EPA formally responded to the criticism through the
rulemaking docket, though very briefly. EMISSIONS STANDARDS DIV, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
OAR-2002-0056-6215, RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED CLEAN AIR
MERCURY RULE 10-4 (2005), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/sec_111_respcom_oar-2002-00566206.pdf (“EPA is aware of the concern expressed by the commenters and has responded to the
Congressional inquiries. The material in question was provided to EPA through the Clean Air Act
Advisory Committee working group process established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) and, thus, we do not feel that its use was inappropriate.”).
181. See COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE AND SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE: PROPOSED NAT’L EMISSION
STANDARDS FOR HAPS; AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR NEW
AND EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES,OAR-2002-0056 (June 28, 2004) (comments of state attorney
generals
and
environmental
officials
opposing
cap-and-trade
proposal),
http://www.4cleanair.org/Oldmembers/members/committee/airtoxics/stateAGsmercurycomments.pdf;
Jennifer 8. Lee, White House Minimized the Risks of Mercury in Proposed Rules, Scientists Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/07/us/white-house-minimized-the-risks-ofmercury-in-proposed-rules-scientists-say.html.
182. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 170.
183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-252 , CLEAN AIR ACT: OBSERVATIONS ON
EPA’S COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ITS MERCURY CONTROL OPTIONS (2005) [hereinafter 2005 GAO
REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245489.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, 2005-P-00003, ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF MERCURY EMISSIONS NEEDED BEFORE EPA
FINALIZES RULES FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2005) [hereinafter 2005 EPA OIG REPORT],
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/91018FYT.PDF?Dockey=91018FYT.PDF.
184. 2005 EPA OIG REPORT, supra note 184, at 13.
185. Id. at 13–15.
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Furthermore, the OIG concluded that the true basis for the thirty-four tons
– the co-benefits projected under the Clean Air Interstate Rule – did not comply
with the MACT requirements of CAA. As to the cap-and-trade plan, the OIG
criticized its lack of stringency and implicitly questioned the veracity of the
drafters.186 The OIG also found that staff had been pressured to base the benefits
analysis of the proposed rule on the public comments solicited through the NODA
(many of which came from utilities), rather than on the scientific literature.187
Finally, the OIG noted that several documents it had requested had not
been provided by EPA, including statistical analyses for MACT model runs, interagency communications, and information as to how the Latham & Watkins
memoranda language got into the proposed rule.188 In its response to the OIG’s
draft report, EPA simply disputed several of the factual assertions—including that
it had started with the thirty-four-ton emissions goal and manipulated MACT
calculations to meet it—but did not address the report’s recommendations.189
The GAO also investigated the 2004 Proposed Rule, specifically the costbenefit analyses used to compare the proposed cap-and-trade plan with the MACT
rule, and found such analyses significantly lacking. While EPA examined the costs
of the MACT rule by itself, it analyzed both the costs and benefits of the cap-andtrade plan in the context of the CAIR rule, making comparison between the two
impossible. Perhaps most critically—and inexplicably—EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis of the two options failed to quantify the actual primary health benefits of
mercury emissions reductions.190 Instead, EPA calculated the secondary health
benefits accruing from the reduction of fine particles, such as decreases in
respiratory diseases and heart attacks.191 As did the OIG, the GAO also faulted
EPA for its lack of transparency in developing the proposed rule.192
d.

The Clear Skies Act Reborn: Reversing the 2000 Listing Rule and
Implementing Cap-and-Trade Under CAMR

Largely ignoring the criticism from congressional members,
environmentalists, EPA’s own inspector general, and the GAO, EPA ultimately
promulgated the Section 111(d)-based cap-and-trade plan in their final Clean Air
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”),193 followed by the 2005 Delisting Rule.194 EPA
characterized the new cap-and-trade plan as “the best method for encouraging the
continued development of [emissions control] technologies.”195 The 2010 cap

186. See id. at 15.
187. Id. at 33.
188. Id. at 9, 41.
189. Id. at 49.
190. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 184, at 12.
191. Id. at 12 & n.15.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: EGUs, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75) [hereinafter 2005 CAMR].
194. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 15,994 (“We are taking this action because we now
believe that the December 2000 finding lacked foundation and because recent information demonstrates
that it is not appropriate or necessary to regulate [EGUs] under section 112.”).
195. 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615.
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under the 2005 CAMR was even higher than EPA OIG had anticipated, at thirtyeight tons, with a 15 tpy cap coming into effect in 2018.196 According to EPA, the
caps would reduce mercury emissions by “up to 70%,” significantly less than the
2000 Regulatory Finding proposed.197 Direct health benefits of the mercury
reductions from the 2005 CAMR were projected at a modest 0.2 to 3 million
dollars a year by 2020.198 As had been promised in the 2004 Proposed Rule, the
final Phase I cap would not require additional mercury-specific mitigation
technologies, as the 38 tpy figure was the estimated amount of mercury reduction
as a co-benefit from already-existing SO2 and NOX rules.199 As had been
contemplated in the 2004 Proposed CAMR, EGUs would be able to bank
allowances for future use, but the “safety valve” provision was removed.200 The
cap-and-trade system would be implemented by the states pursuant to State
Implementation Plans subject to review by EPA, with states failing to participate
still required to reduce emissions below their cap.201
Under the 2004 Proposed CAMR, the cap for the cap-and-trade plan
would have been based on concurrently offered CAA Section 112 new source
MACT standards, which would equal the “best controlled similar source.”202
However, purportedly responding to commenters who argued that even that was
too strict for Section 111 emissions standards—which require explicit
consideration of cost—EPA revised the cap upwards.203 Those caps were not based
on mercury-specific control technologies, but rather on controls that would be
installed to control PM2.5 and SO2, as EPA argued that stringent mercury-specific
control technologies could not be installed and operated on a national scale by the
2018 final cap deadline.204 Even given those limitations the mercury emissions

196. Id. at 28,606; see also Jana B. Milford & Alison Pienciak, After the Clean Air Mercury Rule:
Prospects for Reducing Mercury Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 43 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 2669,
2669 (2009).
197. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R05-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE 3-3 (2005),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/91011BYT.PDF?Dockey=91011BYT.PDF.
198. See 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,642, 28,643 tbl.3. These costs were based on “avoided
IQ decrements in potentially prenatally exposed children . . . and the benefits of reducing directly
emitted [particulate matter].” Id. at 28,641. Details about the modeling of these benefits were provided
in the separate Regulatory Impact Assessment.
199. Id. at 28,617–18.
200. Id. at 28,629–30.
201. Id. at 28,607.
202. Id. at 28,615.
203. Id. Compare 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4690, with 2005 CAMR, supra note
194, at 28,615. Depending on source subcategory, the final standards were less stringent by factors of
approximately 2 to 5.
204. 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615–16. While the 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT had
concluded that reliably controlling mercury emissions from coal-fired EGUs was “several years away,”
1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at 6-2, in the years since that report was
published a joint DOE-industry pilot program had made significant gains by the time of the 2005
CAMR. See generally John H. Pavlish et al., Status Review of Mercury Control Options for Coal-Fired
Power Plants, 82 FUEL PROCESSING TECH. 89 (2003).
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released from the “best controlled similar sources” upon which the caps were based
also assumed particularly high levels of mercury in source coal.205
Two weeks after publishing the 2005 CAMR, EPA issued the 2005
Delisting Rule removing EGU-sourced mercury as a Section 112 HAP.206 The
conventional HAP delisting process under §112(c)(9) would have required EPA
determine that no EGU—or EGU category—would release mercury emissions
above a level adequate to protect public health and preclude adverse environmental
effects.207 Even the Bush-era EPA seemed unwilling to make such a clearly
implausible determination, so instead the 2005 Delisting Rule simply concluded
that the delisting requirements of Section 112(c)(9) need not be met, that the
“appropriate and necessary” standard gave EPA significant discretion in how to
treat EGU-sourced HAP, and thus “nothing precludes [EPA] from revising [the]
appropriate and necessary finding” based on initial error or new information.208
EPA’s position was that the 2000 Listing Decision was fundamentally unwarranted
at the time it was made, and it offered a lengthy argument that EGU-sourced
mercury did not pose a significant health hazard, particularly after the mercury
reduction co-benefits of recent regulation were taken into account.209 Such
marginal health benefits, argued the 2005 Delisting Rule, have been substantially
outweighed by the costs of compliance were mercury to be regulated under Section
112.210
205. See 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615; see also JIM EDDINGER, COMBUSTION GROUP,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM ON STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MERCURY TEST DATA TO
DETERMINE BDT FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS 3 (March 15, 2005), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/
nsps_doc_oar-2002-0056-6192.pdf (“Using the highest [mercury] fuel content ensures that the
developed NSPS limit are achievable by a unit located anywhere in the United States.”).
206. Requests for reconsideration of both the 2005 Delisting Rule and CAMR were filed with EPA,
but were denied in a subsequent rule that only made minor substantive changes to State mercury
allocations and some of the section 111(d) new source standards. See Revision of December 2000 CAA
Section 112(n) Finding Regarding EGUs; and Standards of Performance for New and Existing EGUs:
Reconsideration, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,388, 33,389 (June 9, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii) (2012).
208. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,002.
209. Those other rules included new NSPS standards for NOX emitted from utility and industrial
boilers, and the requirement that 22 states and the District of Columbia revise their state implementation
plans to mitigate interstate transport of ozone. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,004. The
argument that remaining mercury emissions after those rules would have minimal health impacts was
supported by EPA deposition modeling described in the rule. Id. at 16,015–21. EPA based its
conclusions on modeling runs using CMAQ, its general-purpose atmospheric processes model, when
applied to mercury the CMAQ had at that point shown a tendency to predict smaller aqueous mercury
concentrations than other mercury models commonly used by scientists and governmental agencies. See
Alexey Ryaboshapko et al., Comparison of Mercury Chemistry Models, 36 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 3881,
3894–95 (2002). A 2005 peer review panel that evaluated the CMAQ model noted that the CMAQ
results for the 2005 CAMR were not particularly robust. PRAVEEN AMAR ET AL., FINAL REPORT:
SECOND PEER REVIEW OF THE CMAQ MODEL 13 (2005) https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-05/documents/final_report_second_peer_review_of_the_cmaq_model_july_2005
.pdf. Generally, the results of even good faith modeling can show dramatically different results based on
model parameters and assumptions.
210. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,000–01, 16,021–22. EPA justified the decision through
a number of assumptions, including that only freshwater fish should be analyzed, that only women of
childbearing age are at risk, that research showing high levels of consumption by certain subpopulations
should not be relied upon, and that only utility-attributable mercury should be measured. Id.
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New Jersey v. EPA

EPA’s new mercury strategy was met with intense criticism; members of
Congress introduced joint resolutions to disapprove the rule under the
Congressional Review Act, which if successful would have forced EPA to issue a
MACT-based rule, though the resolution did not pass.211 Dissatisfied with the lack
of stringency, many states later issued their own EGU-sourced mercury regulations
that went well beyond the 2005 rule.212 Predictably, a number of environmental
groups and states appealed the 2005 Rule to the D.C. Circuit Court.213 On February
8, 2008, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2005 Rule in New Jersey v. EPA, finding
EPA’s delisting decision violated the plain text and structure of Section 112
because EPA did not make the necessary findings required to delist HAP under
Section 112(c)(9).214 EPA raised different statutory construction and deference
arguments but the Court rejected them, holding that Congress had intentionally
removed significant discretion from the HAP listing process—and that included the
EGU-sourced mercury process—precisely because it considered EPA too reluctant
to list HAPs.215
Because the court concluded that the 2005 Delisting Rule was invalid,
EGU-sourced HAP including mercury remained regulated under Section 112,
precluding them from regulation under Section 111 and resulting in the Court
vacating both the 2005 Delisting Rule and the 2005 CAMR. The New Jersey
decision came out shortly before President Bush was to leave office, and future
EGU mercury emissions regulations would wait for his successor. One of the last
actions the administration took on EGU-sourced mercury emissions was cancelling
DOE field tests of mercury emissions reduction technology— once they started to
show low-cost reduction of 90 percent or more of emissions was possible.216 Bills

211. S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808
(2012). Of course, overturning the 2005 Delisting Rule would have likely lead to further battles on the
suitability of the MACT standards already developed by EPA. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & RICHARD S.
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22207, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF EPA’S MERCURY RULE 2
(2005),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050725_RS22207_64e65541441ca2d9d4e1a075110
d9d8ccad482f7.pdf.
212. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33535, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: STATES ARE SETTING STRICTER LIMITS 2 (2007), https://www.
everycrsreport.com/files/20070222_RL33535_9490786af904352a3618fa139135a3471dab06fb.pdf. The
Congressional Research Service would also analyze the 2005 CAMR rule and come to a similar
conclusion as EPA and 2005 GAO reports. See DANA A. SHEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32744, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS: A REVIEW OF EPA ANALYSIS
AND MACT DETERMINATION (2005), https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL32744.pdf.
213. New Jersey, v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. dismissed, 555 U.S. 1162 (2009), and
cert. denied sub nom., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. New Jersey, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
214. Id. at 583.
215. Id. at 582–83.
216. See 2009 GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 6 (“[W]hile a number of short-term tests achieved
mercury reductions in excess of 90 percent, the amount of sorbent injection that achieved the reductions
was often decreased during long-term tests to determine the minimum cost of achieving, on average, 70
percent mercury reductions. Beginning in 2007—near the end of the research program—DOE field tests
aimed to achieve reductions of 90 percent or greater mercury at low costs. However, DOE reported that
federal funding for the DOE tests was eliminated before the final phase of planned tests was
completed.”).
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were again introduced in Congress to force EPA to implement strict EGU-sourced
mercury emissions limits, though none passed.217
2.

2008-2016: The Obama Administration and Air Pollution Control

President Obama’s entry into the White House signaled a change in EPA’s
approach to pollution control, particularly regarding atmospheric pollution. His
environmental record as a state legislator in Illinois and the U.S. Senate had been
mixed;218 however, in light of his pro-environmental campaign rhetoric, and the
fact that his immediate predecessor compiled what had been widely considered one
of the worst environmental records, if not the worst, in U.S. history,
environmentalists were optimistic.219 Immediately after taking office he quickly
moved to halt the flurry of “midnight regulations” the Bush EPA had attempted to
push through the regulatory process at the end of that administration, though with
mixed success.220
217. E.g., Mercury Emissions Control Act, S. 2643, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008) (requiring EPA to
promulgate regulations that reduce mercury from new and existing EGUs by “not less than 90 percent”);
Mercury Emissions Reduction Act, H.R. 1087, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (amending section 112 to require
EPA to promulgate EGU-sourced emissions standards within one year); Healthy Air and Clean Water
Act, H.R. 3989, 110th Cong. § 702 (2007) (setting mercury emissions limits for EGUs at .6 lbs per
trillion Btu).
218. Ken Dilanian, Obama’s Record on Coal Support, USA Today( July 18, 2008),
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-07-17-obama-coal_N.htm (“[A]s a
state senator . . . he usually supported bills sought by coal interests, according to legislative records and
interviews.”); see LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, National Environmental Scorecard: Senator
Barack Obama, http://scorecard.lcv.org/moc/barack-obama (last visited Nov. 8, 2017) (Awarding him a
cumulative score of 72% on his “National Environmental Scorecard” during his Senate tenure; though
they record him as voting against environmental protection only twice, he did miss numerous votes on
environmental legislation, driving down his score.).
219. Suzanne Goldberg, The Worst of Times: Bush’s Environmental Legacy Examined, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/greenpolitics-georgebush
(The spokesperson for the Sierra Club stated: “[The Bush administration] has undone decades if not a
century of progress on the environment . . . “ “[His] administration has introduced this pervasive rot into
the federal government which has undermined the rule of law, undermined science, [and] undermined
basic competence. . . . We’re excited just to push the reset button.” ); John Vidal, Obama Victory
Signals Rebirth of US Environmental Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2008, 9:42 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/nov/05/climatechange-carbonemissions (President of
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund stated that “[f]or the first time in nearly a decade, we can look to the
future with a sense of ope that the enormous environmental challenges we face will begin to be
addressed. . . . It is difficult to describe the damage done by the Bush administration’s misguided and
destructive environmental policies.”); see COUSINS ET AL., supra note 152, at iv (“Over the course of the
first term, [the Bush} administration led the most thorough and destructive campaign against America’s
environmental safeguards in the past 40 years.”).
220. Gale Lea Rubrecht, President Obama Halts Midnight Regulations, 24 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 47, 47–49 (2009); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Midnight Hour, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2008),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/midnight-hour; R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to
Deregulate,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
31,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/30/AR2008103004749.html; Bryan Walsh, George W. Bush’s Last
Environmental Stand, TIME (Nov. 5, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,
8599,1856829,00.html. For a comprehensive listing of President Bush’s attempted “midnight
regulations,” see Joaquin Sapien & Jesse Nankin, Midnight Regulations, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 2008),
https://www.propublica.org/special/midnight-regulations. The updates on the status of each are years out
of date.
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The Obama EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Rule

President Obama had previously indicated his willingness to take action
on mercury. While a Senator, he introduced two pieces of legislation aimed at
reducing environmental mercury emissions,221 and had been a co-sponsor of the
unsuccessful resolution to nullify the 2005 Delisting Rule. Shortly after he won the
2008 presidential election, several non-profit groups brought suit in D.C. District
Court to compel EPA to create EGU-sourced mercury MACT standards, and EPA
entered into a consent decree requiring promulgation of MACT standards in 2011,
with final regulations to follow in six months.222
The proposed regulations, published on May 3, 2011, would impose
stringent controls on EGU-sourced HAP, including mercury, under Section 112.223
Under the proposed standards, mercury reductions would be reduced from a
baseline projected 29 tpy to 6 tpy by 2015, with additional reductions in the other
HAP identified in the Utility Study.224 The proposed rule drew significant attention;
EPA received a record breaking more than 900,000 public comments, far more than
any similar proposed regulation.225 Many, particularly from individual members of
the public, strongly supported stringent regulation of EGU-sourced mercury,
though the EGU industry and its allies protested EPA’s scientific and legal
rationales for both the “confirmation” of the 2000 Listing Rule and the proposed
standards.226
On February 16, 2012, EPA issued the final 2012 MATS Rule, slightly
modified from the proposed Rule but instituting similar emissions standards that
would reduce EGU-sourced mercury emissions from a newly projected 27 tpy
down to 7 tpy.227 In terms of mercury emissions standards, the 2012 MATS Rule
used a more stringent analysis to determine the MACT floor than had the 2004

221. Missing Mercury in Manufacturing Monitoring and Mitigation Act, S. 3631, 109th Cong.
(2006) (amending the Toxic Substances Control Act to phase out the use of mercury in chlorine and
caustic soda manufacturing); Mercury Export Ban Act of 2008, S. 906, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted)
(amending the Toxic Substances Control Act to prohibit federal agencies from selling or conveying
mercury, and to ban the export of mercury outside the United States). The first bill would die in
Committee, though the second would be signed into law by President Bush.
222. See Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 1:08-cv-02198, 2010 WL 1506913, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Apr.
15, 2010). State and industry actors sought to prevent the Consent Decree, but did not prevail. See Am.
Nurses Ass’n, No. 1:08-cv-02198 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2011) (order denying motion to alter judgments).
Further proceedings were mooted when EPA promulgated of emissions standards in December of 2011.
223. Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976
(proposed May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 60, 63) [hereinafter 2011 Proposed Mercury and
Air Toxics Standards or 2011 Proposed MATS Rule].
224. Id. at 25,073 tbl.21. The 2011 Proposed MATS was also projected to reduce hydrogen chloride
by 68,000 tpy and through HAP control co-benefits, SO2 by an additional 2.1 million tpy, NOX by
100,000 tpy, PM2.5 by 83,200 tpy, and CO2 by 24.2 million tpy. Id.
225. 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9306.
226. EPA aggregated, summarized, and responded to many of these comments in the final rule. See
id.
227. Id. at 9424 tbl.7. Projected emissions reductions had changed for other HAPs as well, as did
projections of baseline HAP emissions absent the 2012 MATS Rule. Compare id., with 2011 Proposed
MATS, supra note 224, at 25,073 tbl.21.
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Proposed CAMR or 2005 CAMR.228 While EPA conducted a thorough analysis of
the costs of the 2012 MATS Rule, concluding that they were outweighed by the
benefits, it also concluded that it did not need to account for costs before regulating
EGU-sourced HAPs.229 Likely foreseeing legal and political pushback from the
EGU industry, EPA also conducted extensive new modeling of mercury risk,230 and
relied heavily on its independent Scientific Advisory Board (“SAB”) to review its
methodologies and assumptions.231 Significant changes were made to the scientific
technical and evaluation, but even after the suggested modifications were made, the
models still showed that, contrary to the conclusions reached by EPA when
justifying the 2005 Delisting Rule, EGU-sourced mercury posed a discrete hazard
to human health.232 EPA used the same deposition model to support the listing
decision in the 2012 MATS Rule as it had for the 2005 Delisting Rule, but
incorporated more data and used different modeling assumptions and higher spatial
resolution.233
b.

Michigan v. EPA

The Final Rule was appealed in White Stallion Energy Center, L.L.C. v.
EPA, this time by impacted companies, industry and labor groups, and states, while
environmental groups, other industry groups and states intervened in support of the
Rule.234 The central argument by petitioners was that EPA improperly decided that
it was “necessary” and “appropriate” to list EGU-sourced mercury without
considering the costs, as it was implausible that Congress would want no attention
paid to cost considerations.235 The D.C. Circuit court rejected that argument, siding
228. For example, existing EGUs using bituminous coal—the most common type—would have had
their emissions limited or capped to .021 lbs per gigawatt hour (“lb/GWh”) by the 2004 Proposed
CAMR, but now were limited to .013 lb/GwH by the 2012 MATS Rule. Compare 2004 Proposed
CAMR, supra note 166, at 4662 tbl.1, and 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615, with 2012 MATS
Rule, supra note 4, at 9367 tbl.3. The 2012 MATS Rule also included emissions standards for other
HAPs, while the 2005 CAMR only regulated mercury and nickel. Compare 2012 MATS Rule, supra
note 194, at 9367 tbl.3, with 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615.
229. See 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9425-32. Many of the stated benefits were based on cobenefit reductions of particulate matter. Id. at 9431 tbl.11, 9432.
230. E.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA452/R-11-009, REVISED TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: NATIONAL-SCALE ASSESSMENT OF
MERCURY RISK TO POPULATIONS WITH HIGH CONSUMPTION OF SELF-CAUGHT FRESHWATER FISH
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 REVISED TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/
utility/revisedmercurytsd.pdf; OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-013, SUPPLEMENT TO THE NON-HG CASE STUDY CHRONIC INHALATION RISK
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY ANALYSIS FINDING FOR COAL-AND
OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS (2011), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100DFR6.PDF
?Dockey=P100DFR6.PDF.
231. 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9312–18 (describing consultation with SAB).
232. Sensitivity analyses examine how changing model variables—in this case for example, only
looking at high-mercury-deposition watersheds, or changing consumption patterns—altered the overall
population risk values derived by the model, and found that such changes did not significantly reduce
that risk. See id. at 9315–16.
233. See 2011 Revised Technical Support Document, supra note 231, at 48 (2011) (describing the
differences between the modeling for the 2005 Delisting Rule and the 2012 MATS Rule).
234. 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
235. Id.at 1236.
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with EPA and intervenors and holding that under the plain language of CAA
Section 112(n)(1), EPA was ordered to list EGU-sourced mercury as a HAP if it
“f[ound] such regulation appropriate and necessary after considering the results of
the [EPA and NIEHS studies],”236 and thus the decision to list was therefore
predicated solely on the determination of whether EGU-sourced mercury was a
public health hazard. Any cost considerations would then be incorporated when
actually setting MACT emissions limits.237 Industry and state actors opposing the
rule appealed to the Supreme Court on the cost consideration issue under the
MATS Rule.238
As the Supreme Court noted in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, it
had previously “refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an
authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly
granted.”239 On its face, the Court seemed to be addressing a similar situation when
reviewing EPA’s “appropriate and necessary” determination: the CAA, particularly
after the 1990 Amendments, explicitly requires EPA to consider costs before
making regulation decisions in a number of provisions.240 In the amended Section
112 provisions at issue, Congress had not only failed to expressly require EPA to
consider costs when making the “appropriate and necessary” determination, but
had mandated that it only make such a determination after considering the results
of the 1998 Utility Study, the statutory requirement of which was purely a public
health analysis.241
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to Section 112 also
strongly suggested that Section 112’s sole focus on health survived the 1990
Amendments, with EPA being required to add a substance to the HAP list generally
“upon a showing . . . that emissions . . . are known to cause or may reasonably be
anticipated to cause adverse effects to human health or adverse environmental
effects.”242 Indeed, the provision that excepted EGU-sourced HAP from automatic
regulation was added in conference and then only because Congress seemed
reluctant to regulate where the separate acid rain provisions of the 1990
Amendments might remedy the problem.243 For HAPs from all other major sources
not likely to be impacted by the acid rain provisions, EPA was only to consider
costs in the emissions standards stage of regulation, and even then the MACT floor
236. Id. at 1239 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
237. See id. at 1238–41.
238. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (mem) (granting petition for writ of certiorari limited
to the question of “[w]hether the [EPA] unreasonably refused to consider cost in determining whether it
is appropriate to regulate [HAPs] emitted by [EGUs].”).
239. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001) (citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246, 257 & n.5 (1976)).
240. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (requiring EPA to take into account “the cost of
achieving such reduction” when setting standards of performance for new stationary sources); id. §
7545(k)(1)(A) (requiring EPA “tak[e] into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions
reductions” when setting standards for reformulated gasoline”); id. § 7547(a)(3) (requiring emissions
standards for nonroad engines and vehicles be “the greatest degree . . . achievable . . . giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of applying such technology. . . . “).
241. Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
242. Id. § 7412(b)(3)(B).
243. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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required a certain minimum emissions standards, notwithstanding the cost.244
Furthermore, giving the ambiguity of the “appropriate and necessary”
determination, EPA would seem to have significant discretion under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to determine just what that
meant.245
However, rejecting the applicability of both American Trucking Ass’ns
and Chevron, the Court ruled 5-4 in favor of petitioners, holding that it “strayed far
beyond [Chevron’s] bounds” when it made its “appropriate and necessary” listing
decision without paying attention to cost considerations.246 Arguing that such a
“capacious[]” phrase required that “all the relevant factors” be considered, the
opinion reasoned that for its listing decision to be “appropriate,” at least some
attention to cost must be paid; otherwise, the potential could arise that “billions in
economic costs” might be incurred “in return for a few dollars in health or
environmental benefits.”247 Conceding that other Section 112 listing decisions were
based on the threat to human health or the environment, the Michigan majority
characterized the EGU-specific “appropriate and necessary” section as Congress
enacting different and “unique” requirements to be met before regulating EGUsourced HAP.248 The four justices dissenting argued that EPA had, in fact, paid
significant attention to costs throughout the entire process, and would do so again,
faulting the majority for unduly focusing on the one initial stage of the regulatory
decision where cost was not required under the statute.249
3.

The Trump Administration and the Future of the Mercury and Air
Toxics Rule

While many observers had assumed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
denial of a stay on the 2012 MATS Rule that the final rule would stand, Trump’s
election and his appointment of Scott Pruitt—who had himself litigated against the
2012 MATS Rule as Attorney General of Oklahoma—has called that into question.
A number of parties appealed the 2016 Supplemental Finding on various grounds,
arguing inter alia that the cost analyses done by EPA did not comply with
Michigan or CAA, and impermissibly counted the co-benefits of reducing nonHAP pollutants.250
Though Obama’s EPA had opposed the appeal along with a number of
state and non-governmental organization intervenors, the Trump EPA would later
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)–(3).
245. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron, coincidentally, was addressing a similar issue; EPA’s
discretionary authority to define a term under the CAA. Id. at 840.
246. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2710.
249. Id. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
250. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2016), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/files/2016/11/Murray-Energy-v-EPAPetitioners-combined-opening-brief-11-18-16.pdf. Though petitioners attack the 2016 Supplemental
Rule for a variety of alleged flaws, the central arguments are that EPA impermissibly: (1) failed to
adequately compare costs and benefits, id. at 28–40; (2) considered the co-benefits of reducing nonHAP pollutants in the benefit-cost analysis it did do, id. at 41–55; and (3) did not consider alternative
control strategies and all relevant costs, id. at 58–63.
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move to continue the oral arguments on petitioners’ motion, because “[i]n light of
the recent change in Administration . . . the appropriate officials [need] adequate
time to fully review the Supplemental Finding.”251 EPA further notes that those
officials may “reconsider the rule or some part of it.”252 The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals granted EPA’s motion to continue, requiring the agency to report on the
status of its review every 90 days, but not giving any specific deadline to complete
that review.253 In the meantime, the 2012 MATS Rule seems to remain in place.
EPA left unclear how exactly it would “reconsider the rule or some part of
it” in light of the requirements of section112. Instead, EPA vaguely references
“[a]gencies[‘] . . . inherent authority to reconsider past decisions and to revise,
replace or repeal a decision to the extent permitted by law. . . . “254 The primary
difficulty in “reconsider[ing]” the rule, of course, is as the D.C. Circuit Court noted
in New Jersey v. EPA, it is far more difficult for EPA to add a pollutant to the HAP
list—CAA Section 112(b)(3)(C) forbids removing EGU-sourced mercury as a HAP
absent a finding that “emissions, ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation or
deposition of the substance may not reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse
effects to the human health or adverse environmental effects.”255 In the case of
mercury, this would be impossible—there is no dispute that bioaccumulation can
cause adverse effects to human health and the environment.256 Still, as the 2005
Delisting Decision and 2005 CAMR demonstrated, even regulatory decisions that
appear on their face to be invalid can delay stringent regulations for years while
they work their way through the rulemaking and court systems.
Additionally, in terms of real-world effects, even were the 2016
Supplemental Finding to be successfully withdrawn (or, withdrawn for a number of
years while the inevitable litigation worked its way through the court system), the
vast majority of EGUs have already complied with the 2012 MATS Rule’s
emissions requirements or, in the case of older plants, have shut down.
Furthermore, coal-fired EGUs are increasingly disadvantaged economically in
251. Respondent EPA’s Motion to Continue Oral Argument at 1, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No.
16-1127 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/mats_supp_finding__epa_motion_to_continue_oral_arg_-_4-18-17.pdf .
252. Id. at 5.
253. Order at 1, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. April 27, 2017). Both
industry petitioners, and state and NGO intervenors opposed the continuation; the former largely
because of the uncertainty involved to industry. See Industry Respondent-Intervenors’ Opposition to
Motion to Continue Oral Argument, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. April 24,
2017); Non-Governmental Organization Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion to Continue Oral Argument,
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. April 21, 2017); State and Local Government
Respondent-Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion to Continue Oral Argument, Murray Energy Corp. v.
EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. April 21, 2017). As of October 27, 2017, “EPA [was] continuing to review
the Supplemental Finding to determine whether the rule should be maintained, modified, or otherwise
reconsidered.” EPA’s Status Report, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27,
2017).
254. Respondent EPA’s Motion to Continue Oral Argument at 5, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No.
16-1127 (April 18, 2017).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(C) (2012).
256. Though EPA does not reference New Jersey v. EPA in its motion to continue, all the other
parties note that under New Jersey EPA lacks the authority to simply withdraw the “Necessary and
Appropriate” finding. See sources cited supra note 253.
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comparison to natural gas and renewable energy. Removing the rule might,
however, allow plants to save money by both allowing them to turn off control
technologies as well as not be subject to reporting requirements or enforcement
actions. In any event, the Trump EPA’s position likely signals that the multi-decade
EGU-sourced mercury emissions debates will in fact go on longer.
4.

The Evolving Mercury Emissions Discourse, 2000-2016: Context and
Conclusions

Discerning the why of the second Bush administration’s attempt to head
off stringent mercury regulations is not difficult; he, his vice-president, and many
of his appointees were veterans of the energy industry who adhered to a fiercely
anti-regulatory ideology that saw environmental regulations dangerous not just to
the immediate economy but capitalism, and American economic pre-eminence
itself. The specific how, though, requires a deeper inquiry. It is important to
consider that, historically direct challenges to environmental regulations often
faced congressional, public, and judicial resistance in a way that could be both
politically damaging and result in legislative action that removed significant agency
discretion over environmental policy domains. For example, the HAP provisions of
the 1990 Amendments wherein anti-regulatory actors both inside and outside
government relied increasingly on “low profile” challenges that attempted to
reframe and redirect regulatory discourse in a way that sought to hide goals in
arcane rulemaking processes and technical language.257 Indeed, this strategy switch
can be prominently seen with the second Bush Administration’s Clean Skies Plan;
defeated in Congress and facing significant public backlash, its architects simply
attempted to implement it under the CAA’s rulemaking process.
Both procedural and technical discursive practices were leveraged to
frame, analyze, and regulate mercury emissions in a way that would minimize
industry burdens. On a procedural level President Bush’s appointees shut out
agency and independent scientists, incorporated industry-provided materials
ranging from modeling results to actual industry-drafted language, and drafted both
the rules and the technical documentation alleged to support them in lengthy and
arcane language – the 2005 CAMR and 2005 Delisting Rule made up a combined
and densely technical 135 pages of the Federal Register, while the Regulatory
Impact Analysis document EPA produced to support those rules made up 570
pages. The architects of the 2005 CAMR complemented those tactics by framing
their approach in a way that emphasized uncertainty and downplayed risks; for
example, the 2005 CAMR attempted to undermine EPA’s health assumptions as to
the level at which mercury in fish is likely to cause adverse health effects by
downplaying the reliability of the RfD.258 As presented to the public, the overall
projected emissions of the Clear Skies Act generally were framed as beneficial to
human health, though they only appeared so when compared to a mercury
257. See LAYZER, supra note 16 at 22; see also LAZARUS, supra note 77 at 106 (“[T]he ironic upshot
of the Reagan attack on federal environmental law was most likely more, not less, demanding federal
environmental legislation.”).
258. 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,646 (“The RfD is an estimate (with uncertainty spanning
several orders of magnitude) . . . [that] important[ly] . . . does not define a bright line, above which
individuals are at risk of adverse effect.”).
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emissions baseline which involved no additional mercury emissions regulations
whatsoever.259
Perhaps the most unusual aspect about the 2005 CAMR process was that
even after many of these tactics were exposed not only by the OIG and GAO
reports as well as by significant media coverage, and even after EPA’s own
employees warned that the CAMR was likely unlawful under CAA,260 the CAMR’s
architects simply proceeded to implement it. Considering the substantial public
record of irregularities in the rulemaking process, as well as the almost legally
indefensible 2005 Delisting Decision, it seems possible that they expected the 2005
CAMR to not survive judicial scrutiny. But even delay served the EGU industry
sector, allowing them to put off significant costs and profit from highly-polluting
EGUs that were operating well past their expected lifespan.261
Why did the Bush administration face so little political or electoral fallout
from its intense anti-environmental record?262 Several explanations offer
themselves. Increasing political polarization and partisan animosity is one; in 1970
environmental regulations were supported by large proportions of both the public
and politicians; for example, CAA passed without a single nay vote in the Senate,
and with a single representative voting against it in the House.263 However, the
electoral politics have shown widening between those supporting environmental
protection measures and those opposing them.264 Among the general public there is
still significant support for environmental protection measures, but the past two
decades have also seen significant political polarization generally; even if a
conservative and/or Republican voter had supported stronger EGU-sourced
259. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCES CLEAR SKIES & GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE INITIATIVES 1 (2003), https://archive.epa.gov/clearskies/web/pdf/clear_skies_factsheet.pdf.
260. Pianin, supra note 170.
261. See RACHEL CLEETUS, ET AL.,UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, RIPE FOR RETIREMENT: THE
CASE FOR CLOSING AMERICA’S COSTLIEST COAL PLANTS 1 (2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default
/files/legacy/assets/documents/clean_energy/Ripe-for-Retirement-Full-Report.pdf (“[In 2012] more than
three-quarters of U.S. coal-fired power plants have outlived their 30-year lifespan—with 17 percent
being older than half a century.”). Indeed, in response to the 2012 MATS Rule many of the oldest plants
have closed rather than pay to install mercury control technology. See Owen Comstock, Coal Made Up
More Than 80% of Retired Electricity Generating Capacity in 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.:
TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25272.
262. While President Bush ended his presidency with historically low approval ratings, there is little to
suggest they were driven by his environmental policies. See Paul Steinhauser, Poll: Bush Most Unpopular in
Modern History, CNN: Politics (May 1, 2008, 2:30 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/05/01/pollbush-most-unpopular-in-modern-history.

263. E. W. Kenworthy, Tough New Clean-Air Bill Passed by Senate, 73 to 0, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
1970), http://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/23/archives/tough-new-cleanair-bill-passed-by-senate-73-to-0a-tough-cleanair.html.
264. See Riley E. Dunlap et al., Politics and Environment in America: Partisan and Ideological
Cleavages in Public Support for Environmentalism, 10 ENVTL. POL. 23, 23–24 (2001). Dunlap and his
co-authors chart a significant widening gap between Democratic and Republican lawmakers on
environmental issues from 1973–2000, driven by movement on both sides—over time Democratic
lawmakers increasingly voted for pro-environmental measures, while Republicans increasingly voted
against those measures. Id. at 29. The gaps between both Democratic and Republican, and liberal and
conservative, members of the public showed less of an overall trend, though self-identified Democrats
and liberals consistently had more pro-environmental views than Republicans and conservatives. Id. at
31–32.
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mercury emissions generally, they might be less likely to vote based on that single
issue in light of general political self-identification.265
When the Obama administration took power, it brought its own discursive
framing to bear. Representing a sharp break from the anti-regulatory ideology of
his predecessor, President Obama pursued the most robust emissions control policy
since the beginning of the CAA, attempting to place significant controls on not
only mercury and other EGU-sourced HAP, but also greenhouse gas emissions
through the rulemaking process with the Clean Power Plan. To head off potential
attacks on the scientific conclusions reached by EPA in enacting the 2012 MATS
Rule, the Obama-era EPA relied heavily on the SAB to vet its research, and
addressed each of the recommendations and requests brought by the SAB in
response.266 Where the Bush-era 2005 CAMR often read like a work of legal
advocacy, the Obama-era 2012 MATS Rule more frequently read like a scientific
article or report, with frequent references to articles in scientific journals that
supported the point under discussion.267 Like the Bush-era EPA, EPA under Obama
framed not only the legal and technical aspects of their program in a way that
counseled taking its chosen policy approach, but also framed opposing viewpoints
by summarizing and framing public comments opposing stringent mercury
regulations in ways that made them seem less credible or as arguing for patently
unlawful or unreasonable interpretations of CAA.268 Though it is early in the
Trump administration, his EPA has already signaled a major rollback of
environmental regulations.269 The fact that petitioners in Murray Energy Corp. v.
Envt’l Prot. Agency have attacked, inter alia, the economic modeling assumptions
underlying the 2016 Supplemental Finding—and the fact that current EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt represented one of the petitioners in the Murray Energy
Corp. case—indicates that EPA’s review may involve the same kind of approach to
modeling assumptions used by the Bush-era EPA to justify the 2005 Delisting Rule
and the 2005 CAMR.
265. Certainly EPA appointees who had masterminded the CAMR avoided any negative effects
outside their personal reputations, particularly among environmentalists, as they successfully re-entered
the EGU lobbying industry when their tenure at the EPA was over. At the time of this writing, former
Air and Radiation head Jeffrey Holmstead is a partner at Bracewell & Giuliani,
https://www.bracewell.com/people/jeffrey-r-holmstead. His deputy, William Wehrum, became head of
Hunton & Williams’ administrative law practice, before returning to EPA in 2017 to become head of the
Air and Radiation office himself. See https://www.law360.com/articles/983588/senate-confirms-huntons-wehrum-to-lead-epa-s-air-office. There is little dispute that the United States electorate has become
increasingly polarized in the past several years. See Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and
Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690 (2015).
While there has been little research done on the importance of environmental views on voting decisions,
most of what has been done suggests it has little effect. See Deborah Lynn Guber, Voting Preferences
and the Environment in the American Electorate, 14 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 455 (2001).
266. See 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9313–19 (describing SAB criticisms and
recommendations and EPA’s response to them).
267. See, e.g., id. at 9352 nn.222–234 (citing numerous scientific articles in support of EPA’s health
study assumptions), 9354 nn.258-67 (same).
268. See id. at 9319–62.
269. See Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How Trump is Changing the Environment,
NAT’L. GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 23, 2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-ischanging-science-environment/.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

If the first (1970-1989) and second (1990-2000) eras of CAA-based
mercury regulatory decisions were defined by inaction and delay, the third (20012017) has seen vigorous battles played out in Congress, EPA rulemaking process,
and the federal courts over how to regulate EGU-sourced mercury. From the
CAA’s creation until the present, a surgent anti-regulatory movement has emerged
and environmental issues have become increasingly polarized, with an executive
branch frequently controlled by politicians either unable or unwilling to fully
implement CAA provisions, particularly regarding HAP. As overt attempts to
weaken or delay CAA provisions proved less effective, politicians and
policymakers interested in reducing environmental regulatory burdens on business
instead turned to lower-profile mechanisms to implement industry-friendly rules.
No process shows this evolution in such sharp relief as President Bush’s Clear
Skies Plan and the controversial implementation of its mercury provisions as the
2005 CAMR. Framed as a means to reduce the dangers posed by, inter alia, EGUsourced mercury, the 2005 CAMR created a regulatory mechanism that essentially
placed no mercury reduction requirements on EGUs for several years.
The tactics used to delay actual mercury emissions reductions
requirements included modifying scientific and technical assumptions to increase
projected costs while reducing projected benefits, all within a rhetorical framing
that strove to appear objective and “scientific.” One particularly common strategy
has been afforded by—and likely partially the cause of—an increase in the length
of regulations. The 1973 rule regulating mercury emissions from chlor-alkali plants
made up 31 pages, including pages discussing beryllium and asbestos, with most of
the Rule setting forth technical and procedural processes to ensure compliance.270
The 2005 CAMR, on the other hand, was more than three times as long, and relied
on even longer technical analyses filed separately on the docket.271
While environmentalists ultimately appeared to have been victorious in
the regulation of mercury emissions by EGUs, the recent announcement by the
Trump EPA has cast the 2012 MATS Rule in doubt again. Furthermore, even if
EPA decides not to withdraw or alter the rule,272 the history of the rule’s passage
shows a costly victory. In the context of the 40-year history of Section 112, the
EGU industry has been the real winner. While it has been the primary source of
270. See Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs, 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8820–50 (Apr. 6, 1973) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
271. See 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,606–700. Of course, such attempts are also served by
ever increasing “additional procedures, analytical requirements, and external review mechanisms” that
have greatly contributed to the size of published regulations generally, and the time it takes to move
from proposed to final rule. See Thomas O. Garity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992).
272. The public has historically been resistant to regulations weakening toxic standards. See
JASANOFF, supra note 16 at 197–98 (discussing the controversy surrounding the regulation of
formaldehyde in the late 70s and early 80s). For one recent example of public opposition to rollbacks on
toxic substances, see Katharine Q. Seelye, E.P.A. to Adopt Clinton Arsenic Standard, NY TIMES (Nov.
1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/us/epa-to-adopt-clinton-arsenic-standard.html (“The
level of 10 parts per billion was proposed by the Clinton administration in January but blocked in March
by the Bush Administration. Mr. Bush has since admitted that it was one of the worst moves of his
young administration . . . .”).
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mercury emissions since at least the 1990s, it has avoided mercury regulations
through appeals to scientific uncertainty and purportedly unreasonably high costs
of control, aided by a well-organized ideological movement against environmental
regulations that has been highly effective not only in Republican administrations
but also Democratic ones.273 As shown above, while anti-regulatory actors were
unable to substantially weaken the CAA itself or delay stringent mercury
regulations indefinitely, by prolonging the debate they were able to let EGUs reap
those financial benefits for decades.
The health costs resulting from this inaction may be substantial. From
1993 until 2011, the percentage of total river miles and lake acres subject to
chemical contamination advisories—with mercury being the most common
contaminant—increased from less than 5% to over 35% for the former, and from
less than 10% to over 40% for the latter.274 The comprehensive technical analysis
produced by EPA for the 2012 MATS Rule, revised in response to peer-review by
SAB, suggests that vulnerable groups especially may be exposed to dangerous
levels purely due to EGU emissions alone, even at the decreased mercury levels
then found in the environment.275 In the context of CAA’s history, then, the delay
in regulating EGU-sourced mercury may have negatively impacted generations of
children, particularly in vulnerable communities where freshwater fish
consumption may be particularly high.
Furthermore, at this point many EGUs have already installed control
technologies (or in the case of older plants, closed down) in response to MATS or
state-level restrictions, and thus have already complied with the 2012 MATS Rule.
While it is likely too soon to determine whether the new mercury control measures
are effective in reducing mercury in waterbodies from which fish are taken, initial
data suggests that they may already be effective in reducing localized mercury
pollution near EGUs that have installed control technologies.276 Furthermore, the
costs of such controls have not proven especially excessive, and the sorbent
injection controls themselves may be even more efficacious than previously
thought by industry actors.277
What policy recommendations can be gleaned from the EGU-sourced
mercury debate? For one thing, it provides an almost textbook example of the
fundamental difficulties of the modern environmental regulatory apparatus; striking
the appropriate balance between giving agencies like EPA sufficient discretion to
regulate pollution in a flexible manner, but not giving them so much discretion that
agency actors hostile to environmental regulation use that flexibility to weaken or

273. See LAYZER, supra note 16, at 66–82, 187–256.
274. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-820-F-13-058, 2011 NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH
ADVISORIES 2 fig.1 (2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/technicalfactsheet-2011.pdf.
275. See 2011 TSD, supra note 30, at 110–11.
276. See Mark S. Castro & John Sherwell, Effectiveness of Emissions Controls to Reduce the
Atmospheric Concentrations of Mercury, 49 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 14000, 14000–07 (2015).
277. 2009 GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 14, 18 (“Overall . . . most plant managers said that the
sorbent injection systems at their plants are more effective than they had originally expected.”).
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delay regulations protective towards human health.278 But as the history described
above demonstrates, even where EPA has not been given discretion, it will often
take it – as in the case of the 2005 CAMR. The history of the EGU-sourced
mercury debate also provides a clear example of the shift from overt challenge or
resistance to CAA requirements to a more covert approach that uses a proenvironmental narrative framing and control of technical analyses to put into place
regulations that benefit industry as much as possible.
What is the best way to regulate either EGU-sourced mercury or other
toxics emissions in the future? In the case of mercury and a number of other
pollutants, the current multi-pollutant approach seems more effective than a singlepollutant one, allowing multiple layers of pollution mitigation regulations that can
reduce a potentially expansive array of pollutants.279 For mercury specifically,
increased government funding for scientific research into areas that are still
uncertain, particularly atmospheric cycling and population-level health effects,
would help, as would implementing a more comprehensive national mercury
deposition monitoring network.280
Dealing with the technical and scientific dimensions of air pollution
control generally may end up being less difficult to resolve than clashes of
ideology, considering that the scientific and technical consensus that mercury
posed a danger to the American public, and that EGU emissions were the largest
anthropogenic source in the United States.281 How can environmental regulations
be effectively implemented when EPA is controlled by those ideologically opposed
to such regulations at a fundamental level, who have developed sophisticated
procedural and discursive strategies they can leverage when they have political
control of EPA? While environmental advocates have successfully headed off
many such attacks in the courts and before legislative bodies, anti-regulatory
interests often hold the advantage because they can frequently achieve their goal by
simply delaying regulations as long as possible. And even though the regulatory
debate over EGU-sourced HAP emissions has on more than one occasion seemed
to have reached a denouement, changes in administration continuously place it
back in question.
Perhaps future regulatory debates would be served best by a more explicit
engagement in ideological disputes, moving away from a technical or scientific
framing of uncertainty towards debates over values: in the face of uncertainty, how
much risk is the public willing to suffer—and who should bear that burden of
uncertainty? Although most of the public has been consistently pro-environmental
regulation, they tend not to make voting choices based on environmental beliefs.282

278. See Williamson et al., supra note 8, at 645 (“The original authorizing statutes often provided
little direction other than broad, sometimes vague, and occasionally contradictory goals.”).
279. Of course, as the history of the 2005 CAMR demonstrates, the multipollutant narrative can be
framed to justify inaction.
280. See L. Zhang et al., Assessment of Modeled Mercury Dry Deposition Over the Great Lakes
Region, 161 ENVTL. POLLUTION 272, 273 (2012) (“Major challenges in quantifying [mercury] dry
deposition at regional scales include . . . insufficient spatial coverage of speciated-mercury measuring
sites . . . . “).
281. See generally 1998 UTILITY STUDY, supra note 125; 2000 NRC REPORT, supra note 32.
282. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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The early 1970s, however, saw a massive public outcry that led to the CAA and
other federal environmental statutes, so it is at least possible that this proenvironmental fervor could recur, or at least the public could move towards a point
where politicians again feel the need to follow along, if only for their own political
careers.283 However, the CAA generally may be a victim of its own success; despite
the critique above in regards to EGU-sourced mercury regulations (or the lack
thereof), in many other ways it has largely been successful, improving the air
quality immensely over the past several decades, if not always to the extent hope
for when it first went into effect.284 That success may help explain the lack of
political consequences for politicians who take an environmentally anti-regulatory
stance in the face of a public that overall tends to favor environmental regulations
by large margins.285 Even when the public expressed support for strong mercury
emission regulations as with the 2005 CAMR, the executive branch seemed
disinclined to listen to them.286
Over the past decades, environmental policy analysts and other social
scientists have worked on increasing public understanding of, and participation in,
environmental policy decisions.287 Furthermore, the increasing risk of dire—and
very visible—consequences of climate change may also help spur increased public
interest in environmental laws and regulations, and if those consequences are as
severe as many scientists project, such involvement will be critical. Increasing
public interest in environmental protection could help push presidential
administrations into taking environmental protection more seriously, and help
fulfill the lofty goals of the environmental regulatory regime envisioned in the
Earth Day era.
Ancient alchemists saw mercury as an element of change and flux;
ideologically-charged actors in the modern federal rulemaking process have
similarly seen the law regarding mercury subject to their own transmutation, able to
be transformed into different manifestations as ideological actors gain control of
the regulatory crucible. Allowing greater public involvement in that alchemy may
ensure that what comes out of the crucible is consistent with what the public
wants—and deserves.
283. See LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 75–77.
284. Concentrations of each NAAQS pollutant in the atmosphere of the United States has shown a
steady downward trend over the past few decades, with particularly significant decreases in the smog
precursors SO2 and NOX. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving
People’s Health, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-improvingpeoples-health (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). Hazardous air pollutant emissions are somewhat harder to
track due in part to their variability, though emissions for many (but not all) HAPs have been similarly
reduced over time. See generally McCarthy et al., Background Concentrations of 18 Air Toxics for
North America, 56 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 3 (2006).
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